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NOTES AND COMMENT
Civil Procedure-Jurisdiction of Transitory Actions-Effect of Re-
striction of Venue After Voluntary Nonsuit
Generally speaking, a liberal attitude is taken in the United States
towards allowing a plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit or to dismiss
his action without prejudice.1 However, there have undoubtedly been
many instances in which plaintiffs have taken advantage of this liberality
in order to obtain a change of venue when such change would not
otherwise be possible.
Attempts to correct this abuse without restricting the plaintiff's right
to take a voluntary nonsuit can be found in statutes and court orders
which provide that, after such dismissal or nonsuit, a subsequent suit
on the same cause of action may be brought only in the court which
granted the nonsuit or dismissal. A problem then arises as to whether
such a statute or court order precludes the plaintiff's bringing a suit
on the same cause of action in the courts of another state, or in the
federal courts, if such courts would otherwise have jurisdiction. This
problqm was considered in two recent cases wherein it was decided
that the subsequent action would not be precluded. 2
One of these cases arose under a Virginia statute.3 The suit was
brought in federal district court in Virginia by a citizen of Ohio against
a citizen of Virginia to recover damages for personal injuries. The
district court dismissed the action on the ground that a dismissal of
"', . .nearly three-fourths of the states give the plaintiff the absolute right
to halt proceedings, discontinue his action, and return again at a more convenient
time upon the same issues, even though the trial was well commenced, or in fact,
nearly over." 37 VA. L. REv. 969, 986 (1951).
North Carolina is one of the most liberal states in this respect. Plaintiff
has the right to take a nonsuit any time before the rendition of the verdict. He
may then institute a new action within one year from the date of the nonsuit.
N. C. Gz. STAT. §§ 1-25, 1-224 (1953). Briley v. Roberson, 214 N. C. 295, 199
S. E. 73 (1938).
Taking a volutary nonsuit in federal court is within the discretion of the
district judge unless it is taken before answer or by stipulation of all parties. FED.
R. Crv. P. 41(a).
The terms "dismissal" and "nonsuit," unless otherwise indicated, are used
synonymously herein, as they generally are. Wetmore v. Crouch, 188 Mo. 647,
87 S. W. 954 (1905) ; 27 C. J. S., Dismissal and Nonsuit § 1 (1941).
2 As both of these cases appear to be decisions of first impression, the purpose
of this note will be to point out the analogous situations and decisions which may
be considered precedents for these decisions and to show that they represent ex-
tensions of the rules set forth in the analogous decisions.
IVA. CODE § 8-220 (1950), which provides that: ". . . after a non-suit no new
proceeding on the same cause of action shall be had in any court other than that
in which the non-suit was taken, unless that court is without jurisdiction, or not
a proper venue, or other good cause be shown for proceeding in another court."
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a prior suit on the same cause of action in a Virginia state court pre-
cluded plaintiff's suit in the district court by reason of the Virginia
statute.4  This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
the 4th Circuit which held, per Parker, Chief Judge, that: "the effect
of the statute is merely to limit the venue of any new action on the
cause of action nonsuited; and, of course, a state venue statute can have
no application to the courts of the United States."5
In the other case, an order of a South Carolina trial court which
granted the dismissal attempted to restrict any subsequent actions on the
same cause of action to that court. However, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that the plaintiff was not precluded from suing
on the same transitory cause of action 6 in the courts of North Carolina. 7
For purposes of discussion, the problem raised in these two cases
can be considered from two aspects: (A) the res judicata effect of a
nonsuit or dismissal which is prejudicial to plaintiff's rights to the ex-
tent of restricting the venue of a subsequent action on the same cause
of action; and (B) the validity of attempts by the courts or legislature
of one state to restrict the venue of a cause of action of which the courts
of other states or the federal courts are otherwise competent to take
jurisdiction.
In both of the principal cases it is obvious that the nonsuits granted
were not intended to bar subsequent actions altogether, but were in-
tended merely to restrict the venue of subsequent actions. There seems
to be no reason, therefore, why the nonsuits in these cases cannot be
brought within the general rule that a judgment of dismissal or non-
'Popp v. Archbell, 108 F. Supp. 571 (E. D. Va. 1952).
Popp v. Archbell, 203 F. 2d 287, 288 (4th Cir. 1953). The decision also
overrules Buchanan v. Norfolk Taxi-Cab Corp., 95 F. Supp. 810 (E. D. Va.
1951), wherein the same construction was given to the statute as in the District
Court's opinion in Popp v. Archbell, 108 F. Supp. 571 (E. D. Va. 1952).
' "Transitory" actions are personal actions; the transactions on which they are
based might take place anywhere; "local" actions, on the other hand, are based
on transactions which could occur only in some particular place. The test as
to whether actions are transitory or local is in the nature of the subject of the
injury, not in the cause of the injury nor the place at which the cause of action
arises. Brady v. Brady, 161 N. C. 325, 326, 77 S. E. 235, 236 (1913) ; McLeod v.
Connecticut & P. R. Co., 58 Vt. 727, 733, 734, 6 Atl. 648, 649, 650 (1886).
T Howle v. Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N. C. 667, 75 S. E. 2d 732 (1953).
Plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, brought an action in North Carolina Superior
Court against defendant, a North Carolina corporation, for damages for personal
injuries sustained in an automobile accident in South Carolina. Plaintiff had
previously brought an action in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas.
That court had granted plaintiff a voluntary nonsuit with limited prejudice, that
is, with the right to renew the action in that county only, but without the right
to bring the action in another county. The trial judge granted the dismissal in
this form because he found that ". . . there is no denial of the defendant's asser-
tion that the underlying purpose of the voluntary nonsuit is to bring the action
in another county." (Emphasis supplied.) 237 N. C. 667, 668, 75 S. E. 2d 732,
734 (1953). In the suit in North Carolina, the trial court allowed defendant's
plea in abatement based on this order. The North Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed.
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suit in a state court which is not an adjudication of the merits of the
controversy will not support a plea of res judicata and will not bar a
subsequent action on the same cause of action in the courts of another
state s or of the United States.9 Conversely, a dismissal which is not
on the merits in a federal court will not bar a new action in a state
court.' 0
A more difficult problem arises when the legislature or the courts
of a state attempt to restrict the prosecution of certain actions, or classes
of action, either to the courts of that state in general or to specific courts.
. An example of this is seen in early cases which arose under a statute
of the Territory of New Mexico" which provided that actions for per-
sonal injuries received in the Territory could be maintained only in
its courts. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, however, allowed a
recovery for personal injuries sustained in New Mexico.12  The United
' Brunswick Tire Corp. v. Credit Tire Stores, Inc., 8 Cal. App. 2d 69, 46
P. 2d 804 (1935); Jones v. Supreme Lodge, K. of H., 236 Ill. 113, 86 N. E. 191(1908) ; Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542 (1907) ;
Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 300 Mo. 1, 254 S. W. 266 (1923) ; see
In re Porep, 60 Nev. 393, 111 P. 2d 533 (1941).
But cf. Welch v. Kroger Grocery Co., 180 Miss. 89, 177 So. 41 (1937) (Plain-
tiff took a voluntary nonsuit in suit in Tennessee when the court was "in the
act of granting" defendant a directed verdict. Held: subsequent suit in Missis-
sippi on same state of facts properly dismissed as Tennessee court had, in effect,
decided defendant's non-liability.); Morrow v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 84
S. C. 224, 66 S. E. 186 (1909) (nonsuit in prior action in North Carolina because
plaintiff's evidence proved as a matter of law that he was not entitled to recover,
held to bar subsequent action on same cause in South Carolina).
' Security Realization Co. v. Henderson, 120 F. 2d 449 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Am-
torg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 108 F. Supp. 170 (S. D.
N. Y. 1952); Jacobs v. North La. & Gulf R. Co., 69 F. Supp. 5 (W. D. La.
1946).
This decision has been reached in cases in which plaintiff took a voluntary
nonsuit after judgment for him in trial court was reversed on appeal, and case
was remanded: Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 150 U. S. 349 (1893) ; South-
western Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Buchanan, 126 F. 2d 179 (5th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U. S. 646 (1942), rehearing denied, 317 U. S. 707 (1942) ; Interstate
Realty and Investment Co. v. Bibb County, Georgia, 293 Fed. 721 (5th Cir. 1923);
Gabrielson v. Waydell, 67 Fed. 342 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1895).
For cases reaching the same result in which the dismissal was for failure
of proof, see: Brooklyn Heights R. Co. v. Ploxin, 294 Fed. 68 (2d Cir. 1923),
eert. denied, 263 U. S. 719 (1923) ; Glencove Granite Co. v. City Trust, etc. Co.
118 Fed. 386 (3d Cir. 1902); Cline v. Southern Ry. Co., 231 Fed. 238 (W. D.
S. C. 1916).
Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ammann, 296 Fed. 453 (3d Cir. 1924) (involun-
tary nonsuit); Bixler v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 201 Fed. 553 (M. D. Pa. 1913)
(compulsory nonsuit).
."E.g., Swift v. McPherson, 232 U. S. 51 (1914); Carr v. Howell, 154 Cal.
372, 97 Pac. 885 (1908); Wells v. Western Union Tel. Co., 144 Iowa 605, 123
N. W. 370 (1909).
" N. M. LAws 1903, c. 33, §§ 1-7.
"
2Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 99 S. W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906),
swit of error denied, Texas Supreme Court, March 13, 1907, aff'd., 213 U. S. 55(1909). But cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Dusablon, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 203, 106 S. W.
766 (1907) (distinguished Sowers case on ground that plaintiff here was resident
of New Mexico and could not disregard its laws by suing in other states when
the New Mexico statute forbade such practice).
[Vol. 32
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States Supreme Court affirmed,13 saying that full faith and credit was
given to the statute when its other conditions (concerning making of
affidavits and certain time limitations) were complied with,14 but that
the right of action could not be restricted as it was based on common-
law principles. 15 This rule was extended in Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R. R. Co. v. George'16 to include actions brought under statutes which
created causes of action not existing at common law.' The Supreme
Court said that venue was no part of the right created,' 8 and that "a
state cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same time
destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court
having jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is to be determined by the law
of the court's creation, and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial
operation of a statute of another state, even though it created the right
of action."' 9
"
1Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, affirming 99 S. W.
190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
14 U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1; 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (Supp. 1949). A state is
required to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings of every other state; but the jurisdiction of a state's courts must be
prescribed by that state's constitution and legislation, and a law attempting to
to interfere with the jurisdiction of another state's courts does not come within
the full faith and credit provision of the Constitution. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 99 S. W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
'Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 70 (1909).
The distinction was accordingly made in several cases that where a statute
created a right not previously existing, a condition could be attached that suits
based on that right be brought only in courts of that jurisdiction. Coyne v.
Southern Pac. Co., 155 Fed. 683 (D. Utah 1907); see Lessenden v. Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co., 238 Mo. 247, 260, 261, 142 S. W. 332, 335, 336 (1911), appeal dis-
missed, 225 U. S. 696 (1911); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Mills, 53 Tex.
Civ. App. 359, 116 S. W. 852, 854 (1909).
"0233 U. S. 354 (1914), affirmig 11 Ga. App. 221, 75 S. E. 567 (1912).
"7 In the George case, supra note 16, suit was brought in Georgia to enforce
a right created by an Alabama statute. An Alabama venue statute, ALA. CODE
§ 6115 (1907), attempted to confine the right to bring such actions to the courts
of Alabama. This provision has subsequently been stricken from the Code, ALA.
CODE, tit. 7 § 63 (1940).
The Georgia Court of Appeals said: "The statute of Alabama is the source
of the right on which the jurisdiction acts; but it is not the source of the juris-
diction itself. We look to the act to determine the right; but we refuse to look
to the law of Alabama to determine what rights the courts of this state will
enforce, or to fix the jurisdiction of its tribunals." Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R. R. Co. v. George, 11 Ga. App. 221, 75 S. E. 567, 571 (1912).
18 Compare the language of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Howle v.
Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N. C. 667, 672, 75 S. E. 2d 732, 736 (1953) : "It
[the order of the South Carolina court dismissing the plaintiff's action with
limited prejudice] pertains to procedure, rather than to the substance of the
cause of action."
"' Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914).
See also, Slaton v. Hall, 172 Ga. 675, 158 S. E. 747 (1931); State ex rel. Bos-.
sung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589 (1918); accord, Houston &
T. C. R. Co. v. Fife, 147 S. W. 1181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), writ of error denied,
Texas Supreme Court, June 26, 1912 (plaintiff not precluded from suing Louisiana
corporation in Texas although the statute which incorporated defendant provided
that actions against it could be brought only at its place of domicile).,
The United States Supreme Court, in the George case, recognized that cases
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The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the Howle case, after finding
that the North Carolina courts would otherwise be competent to take
jurisdiction over this cause of action, discussed the intent of the order
of the South Carolina court and decided that the order was intended
only to prevent the plaintiff from bringing his action in a neighboring
county. The Court felt that the South Carolina court did not intend
that its order should extend beyond the territorial limits of the state,
and that the order could not have such force and effect.20  Although
the Court did not specifically rely on any authority discussed here, the
decision would seem to be an extension of the principle that one state
cannot oust another state's courts of jurisdiction of a transitory cause
of action.
However, where the plaintiff attempts to bring his second action
in a federal court, the conclusion reached must be based on different
principles.
Generally, the rule of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 21 which requires
federal courts to follow state substantive law, does not apply to matters
of practice or procedure, including matters of venue.22  The federal
courts, therefore, cannot be deprived of the jurisdiction granted to them
by Congress, and that jurisdiction cannot be restricted, by a state law
which regulates venue in state courts,23 which confers exclusive juris-
would arise wherein right and remedy are so united that the right can only be
enforced before the tribunal designated by the act. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R.
Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 359 (1914). For examples of such rights, see:
Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel ,Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S .W. 762 (1926) (work-
men's compensation statute); Davis v. P. E. Harris & Co., 25 Wash. 664, 171
P. 2d 1016 (1946) (same).
There are situations not within the scope of this note in which the courts of
the state in which the cause of action is sought to be enforced may refuse to
entertain jurisdiction, particularly if the cause of action arises under a statute
of another state which is penal in character or which is contrary to the public
policy of the state in which the right is sought to be enforced. E.g., Carey v.
Schmeltz, 221 Mo. 132, 119 S. W. 946 (1909).
" Howle v. Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N. C. 667, 672, 673, 75 S. E. 2d
732, 737 (1953).21304 U. S. 64 (1938).
.2 Carby v. Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251 (W. D. Ky. 1940).
However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will not be applied in diversity
cases where such application would permit the contravention of state policy and
state law. Hoosier Cas. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214
(N. D. Iowa 1952).
23 Foote v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 92 F. 2d 744 (5th Cir. 1937) (rule
that only court with power to cancel a sheriff's deed of sale in execution ofjudgment was the court which originally issued the execution order) ; Blunda v.
Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (E. D. Mo. 1947) (provision in non-resident motorists act
that suits under it must be filed in county in which the cause of action accrues) ;
East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Atlanta & F. R. Co., 49 Fed. 608 (C. C. S. D.
Ga. 1892) (state statute providing that suits against a corporation must be brought
in the county in which its principal office is located) ; Davis v. James, 2 Fed. 618(C. C. N. D. Ill. 1880) (state statute allowing guardians to mortgage real estate
of their wards provided that foreclosures of such mortgages could only be had
in the county court which allowed the mortgage); Cunningham v. County of
Rails, 1 Fed. 453 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1880) (state statute providing that actions
against a county shall be brought in the circuit court of such county).
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diction of certain controversies upon its own courts or upon a particular-
court,2 4 or which ". . prescribes the modes of redress in [its] courts,
or which regulates the distribution of [its] judicial power. '25  In ac-
cordance with these principles, the Court of Appeals, in Popp v. Arch-
bell,20 decided that the Virginia statute was a statute regulating practice
and procedure in state courts and could have no effect on federal juris-
diction.
Thus, there is apparently no direct precedent for the decisions in
the principal cases. Yet, on the basis of the decisions in analogous
cases, it would seem that the results reached in these two cases are
correct and proper, in that the jurisdiction of a court should not be re-
stricted or eliminated by laws or rules governing procedure in the courts
of other jurisdictions.
JosEPH G. DAIL, JR.
Constitutional Law-Right of Counsel
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently affirmed the con-
stitutional principle tlat counsel need not be assigned to defend persons
accused of non-capital crimes, absent special circumstances brought to
the attention of the court and revealing the necessity for counsel,-
The English common law denied a person accused of treason or
felony the benefit of counsel,2 and did not even consider the assignment
of counsel,3 while most of the original American colonies at least
nominally provided for the right to counsel.' The privilege, which has
" Barber Asphalt Pay. Co. v. Morris, Judge, 132 Fed. 945 (8th Cir. 1904)
(city charter allowing claims against the city to be appealed only to a certain
state court); Darby v. L. G. DeFelice & Son, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 535 (E. D. Pa.
1950) (statute providing that suits against turnpike commission could be brought
only in courts of certain county) ; Wunderlich v. National Surety Corp., 24 F.
Supp. 640 (D. Minn. 1938) (statute authorizing issue of bonds required suit on
them to be brought within the state) ; Brown v. Return Loads Bureau, 15 F. Supp.
1073 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) (wrongful death statute providing that actions under
it must be prosecuted within the state) ; accord, Slaton v. Hall, 172 Ga. 675, 158
S. E. 747 (1931) (held that action under same wrongful death statute could be
prosecuted in competent court of another state). Cf. Crowley v. Goudy, 173 Minn.
603, 218 N. W. 121 (1928).
As to effect of state statutes granting exclusive jurisdiction over suits af-
fecting probate or administration of decedents' estates to probate courts, see Anno-
tation, 158 A. L. R. 9 (1945).
"Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175 (U. S. 1858) ; Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F. 2d
861 (N. D. N. Y. 1926).
"o Note 5 supra.
1 State v. Cruse, 238 N. C. 53, 76 S. E. 2d 320 (1953).
' Herein, the general constitutional privilege concerning counsel for defense in
criminal cases is called "right of counsel," and includes: (1) "benefit of counsel,"
which means that a person may be represented by a lawyer whom he has em-
ployed; and (2) "assignment of counsel," which means that a person is entitled
to the assignment of a lawyer to defend him.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60 (1932).
'Id. at 64.
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troubled the United States Supreme Court since 19325 and is increas-
ingly-the subject of litigation in state courts,6 has assumed substantial
meaning in recent years7 when the courts have attempted an adequate
definition of the privilege.
In North Carolina the privilege is broadly defined in the Constitu-
tion,8 by statutes,9 and by an early statement of the Supreme Court,",
but later cases applying the rule are less liberal. State v. Hedgebeth"1
contains the fullest statement of the present interpretation, holding the
right to an assignment of counsel mandatory in capital cases, guaran-
teeing those accused of non-capital felonies and misdemeanors the bene-
fit of counsel, and making the assignment of counsel in non-capital
cases dependent on (1) circumstances showing "the apparent necessity
of counsel for the protection of the defendant's rights," and (2) a re-
quest for counsel.12  This case was affirmed by the United States Su-
preme Court,' 3 although the majority' 4 did not rest their decision on
the merits,15 and it is the law in North Carolina today.
'The first significant federal case, preceding the decisions cited herein, was
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
' See list of cases cited in 16 C. 3. S., Const. Law § 591 (Supp. 1953).
.Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N. Y,
U. L. Q. REv. 1, 7, 9 (1944).
I N. C. CoxsT. Art. I, § 11: "In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged
with crime has the right . . . to have counsel for defense. ... "
I I N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4 (1953), enacted in 1777, provides: "Every person,
afcused of any crime whatsoever shall be entitled to counsel in all matters which
may- be necessary for his defense." See N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-4.1, 5 (1953).
1 State v. Collins, 70 N. C. 241, 244 (1874) : "In this country every one has
a: constitutional right in all criminal prosecutions to have counsel for his defense;
and if he be too poor to employ counsel, it is the duty of the court to assign some
one to defend him; and it is the dity of the counsel thus assigned to give to the
accused the benefit of his best exertions. It is gratifying to be able to state that
tlie bench and bar in North Carolina have always dealt mercifully and generously
with those who have had the double misfortune to be stricken with poverty and
accusid of crime."
, ' 228 N. C. 259, 45 S. E. 2d 563 (1947).
;,7 Id. at 266, 45 S. E. 2d at 567.
•:The importance of a request for the assignment of counsel in noncapital cases
isfAipt clear. The general statement in the Hedgebeth case, ibid., places this factor
og an equal plane with "special circumstances," but In Re Taylor, 229 N. C. 297,
30I' 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948), citing the Hedgebeth case, provides that "the ap-
pointment of counsel . . . is discretionary with the trial court." Probably a re-
quest-for counsel in another circumstance which the court considers in determining
whether there was an improper failure to assign counsel, although the broad rule
of the Hedgebeth case is so indefinite that later cases may enlarge or diminish
th importance of a request.
13 Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U. S. 806 (1947).
"justices Rutledge and Douglas dissented.
Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U. S. 806, 807 (1947) : "If petitioner's
allegations, with supporting affidavits, in the habeas corpus proceedings controlled
the issue before us, they would established circumstances that make the right
to assistance of counsel an ingredient of the Due Process clause. * * * Since the
North Carolina Supreme Court went on the ground that it did not have the full
record before it, we are constrained to dismiss the writ because the judgment
below can rest on a non-federal ground."
[Vol. 32
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Several cases have raised the question of what circumstances will
warrant the assignment of counsel in non-capital cases, but the court.
has not given a general rule in answer. Where a person indicted for
violation of a criminal penalty provision of the election law' rejected
the trial court's attempt to assign counsel, no error was found, although
the court seemed to assume that he might have the privilege of assign-
ment of counsel.17  In the Hedgebeth case, 8 a tenant farmer was in-
dicted for "highway robbery." He was twenty-four years old with a
third grade education, without money, unfamiliar with business and,
legal affairs, and although not questioned as to his desire for counsel,
the court held the failure to assign counsel for him was not a denial
of the constitutional privilege. The court's attitude seemed different
where a nineteen year old Negro soldier was charged with assault with
intent to kill. By dictum it indicated that the judge should have as-
signed counsel for the defendant, and reversed his conviction on this
and other grounds.' 9
In the principal case20 an indigent defendant, thirty-nine years of
age, had attended school through the sixth grade, had formerly been
convicted of serious crimes and had served time in prison. Charged
with conspiracy to assault and rob, assault with a deadly weapon with
the intent to kill, and robbery, he did not ask for counsel and after at-
tempting to try his own case was convicted on all counts and given
sentences running consecutively. The court held that there was no
error in the failure of the trial court to assign counsel for him. A
general rule based on these cases can be no clearer than the over-
worked maxim that "each case must stand on its own facts."
Although there is feeling that assignment of counsel is ordered more
frequently now than in the past,2 1 and some decisions do support this
theory,2 2 the North Carolina rule is not in conflict with that of Florida,
Massachusetts, 24 Pennsylvania2 5 and some of the other states.26
There are provisions in the United States Constitution27 which
1 Now N. C. GEN. STAT. § 163-196(10) (1952).
1 State v. Pritchard, 227 N. C. 168, 41 S. E. 2d 287 (1947).
18228 N. C. 259, 45 S. E. 2d 563 (1947).
19 State v. Wagstaff, 235 N. C. 69, 6& S. E. 2d 858 (1951).
.State v. Cruse, 238 N. C. 53, 76 S. E: 2d 320 (1953).
21 Notes, 30 B. U. L. REv. 139, 141 (1940), 42 CoL. L. REv. 271, 282 (1942),
28 TEXAS L. RaV. 236, 240 (1950).
"Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938) ; People v. Avilez, 86 Cal. App. 289,
194 P. 2d 829 (1948) ; Todd v. State, 226 Ind. 496, 81 N. E. 2d 530 (1948) ;
Cogdell v. State, 193 Tenn. 261, 246 S. W. 2d 5 (1951) ; Thorne v. Callahan, 39
Wash. 2d 43, 234 P. 2d 517 (1951).
22 Sneed v. Mayo, - Fla. - , 66 So. 2d 865 (1953).
21 McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874 (1899), followed
in Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 87 N. E. 2d 192 (1949).
"
8Popovich v. Claudy, 187 Pa. Super. 482, 87 A. 2d 489 (1952).
26 See, Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 477 (1942) (appendix). The classifica-
tion set out there does not adequately present the North Carolina rule, however.27 U. S. CONST. AmEND9. V, VI, XIV, § 1.
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affect the state rule concerning the right to counsel, but the application
of these provisions seems to be a policy question on which the members
of the United States Supreme Court have consistently divided, re-
vealing wide differences of opinion. A majority has expressed the idea
that the "due process" clause is the only limit on state interpretation
of this, privilege, defining the test of denial of due process to be whether
the facts of the particular case are "shocking to the universal sense of
justice."28  Another theory in support of this view is that the matter
of criminal justice is properly left in state hands,29 and it has led a
majority to erect technical barriers to the consideration of this privi-
lege.30 The contrary view states that the assignment of counsel is a
fundamental right, and is guaranteed to defendants in all state criminal
cases by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 '
.-Recently the court has recognized this division, 82 and following the
death of two justices usually voting with the minority,8 a rule has
begun to evolve which is a hybrid of the two conflicting views. The
basic theory remains that of the majority,3 4 but in response to a minority
appeal for a formulated principle, Powell v. Alabantau is now cited as
holding that the assignment of counsel in capital cases is required.,
In non-capital cases, the rule remains fluid and the right to assignment
of counsel is said to depend upon the facts of the particular case. 7
The tendency of the federal Supreme Court is to declare the right
to an assignment of counsel in an increasing number of non-capital
cases,3 8 and a dissenting opinion presents the test as the "need" for
counsel, measured by the "nature of the charge and the ability of the
2 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 461 (1942).
"In Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 449 (1948), Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said in dissenting: ". . . intervention by this Court in the criminal processes
of States is delicate business. It should not be indulged in unless no reasonable
doubt is left that a State denies, or has refused to exercise, means of correcting
a claimed infraction of the United States Constitution."
'o In Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 176 (1946), the court, in reaching its
decision that there had been no denial of due process, said ". . . the very narrow
question now before us is whether this common law record establishes that the
defendant's sentence is void . . . ," and repeatedly used the phrase "upon the
record before us" to introduce any statement of law.
" Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 475 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
" Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 440 (1948).
"Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley B. Rutledge.
" Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 441 (1948) : "The philosophy behind
both of these views is that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
or the Fifth Amendment requires counsel for all persons charged with serious
crimes, when necessary for their adequate defense, in order that such persons
may be advised how to conduct their trial."
-"288 U. S. 45 (1932).
"Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 476 (1944) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S.
640, 680 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951).
" Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951) ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773 (1949);
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S.
736 (1948) ; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948).
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average man to face it alone .... ,39 The court has held the failure to
assign counsel to be a denial of due process where the defendant was
incapable of defending himself on trial by reason of his age, race, or
mentality ;40 where the trial court or its officers acted unfairly ;41 and
where the defendant was unable to conduct adequate defense because
of a complex charge or fact situation.42
The rule of the United States Supreme Court affecting the states
is thus similar to the North Carolina rule, but the "special circum-
stances" which require the assignment of counsel in non-capital cases
have been more thoroughly explored, and it is likely that the United
States rule is more liberal than the North Carolina rule. It appears
that a person accused of a non-capital crime in North Carolina today
has no assurance of an assignment of counsel.
The writer suggests that the United States Supreme Court has
maintained a strong and liberal policy on civil rights, including the right
to counsel in criminal cases, expressing a desire to leave the application
of this privilege in the hands of the several states. Thus, the function
of the states is to delineate a policy which will insure defendants in
non-capital cases a substantial constitutional right.
Roy W. DAvis, JR.
Corporations-Dissolution-Deadlock
The problem of corporate stockholder and/or director deadlock
is a familiar one to the practicing corporation lawyer.1 This deadlock
situation is, of course, only one of many problems which arise under
the general subject of dissolution of a corporation, for any cause, at
the instance of minority stockholders. The broader topic above referred
to has already been treated in this Law RevievP and therefore, the
" Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 682 (1948).
" Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951) ("young irresponsible boy" of low
mentality); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948) (eighteen year old "youth
unfamiliar with court procedure") ; De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663(1947) (seventeen year old boy) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945) (Indian).
"'Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 (1948) (defendant threatened by
state's attorney); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 (1948) (court questioned
defendant about former criminal charges, of which he had been exonerated);
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941) (false promises by officers of the court).
,2 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951) (defendant, convicted of robbery,
meant to plead guilty to breaking and entering) ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773
(1949) (court said dounsel could have prevented admission of incriminating testi-
mony) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945) (venue problem of trial court's
jurisdiction over an Indian on reservation).
' For an excellent discussion of the problem in general, see Israels, Deadlock
and Dissolution, 19 CH. L. RE v. 778 (1952).
'Note, 28 N. C. L. Rv. 313 (1950).
"Deadlock, which appears by the decided cases to have occurred only in cor-
porations having a few stockholders, implies dissension due to equal division, and
therefore does not involve problems of protection for the minority." Horstein,
A Remedy for Corporate Abuse, 40 COL. L. Rav. 220, 231 (1940).
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present note will be confined to a discussion only of deadlock situations,
which usually occur in closely held or "family" corporations in which
each group has 50% of the outstanding voting stock. These "glorified
partnerships" will be seen to be extremely vexing headaches when it
is realized that most courts, absent any specific statutory authority, will
not act to dissolve the corporation merely on the grounds of deadlock
or dissension.8
Although courts of equity, even in the absence of a statute, will
sometimes assume jurisdiction,4 the general rule still prevails that
unless specific statutory authority is given, the courts have no right
to interfere in the dispute.5
An increasing number of -decisions, however, seem to exhibit a
willingness to assume jurisdiction where there would be irreparable
injury to the corporation, where the interests of the stockholders may
'Alabama Coal and Coke Co. v. Shackleford, 137 Ala. 224, 34 So. 833 (1903)
(director's terms expired; equity refused to act) ; Drob v. National Memorial
Park, Inc., 28 Del. Ch. 254, 41 A 2d 589 (1945) (no dissolution because there
was a Board of Directors); Lush'us Brand Lithograph Co. v. Fort Dearborn
Lithograph Co., 330 Ill. App. 216, 70 N. E. 2d 737 (1946) ; Wallace v. Pierce-
Wallace Publishing Co., 101 Iowa 313, 70 N. W. 216 (1897) ("a situation into
which the parties voluntarily placed themselves," and equity court would not
dissolve); Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S. W. 2d 625 (1937) ; Mc-
Guire v. Kayser-McGuire Co., 184 Minn. 553, 239 N. W. 616 (1931), commented
on in Note, 16 MINN. L. Rv. 707 (1932); Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140 N. J. Eq.
444, 54 A. 2d 761 (1947) (deadlock; statute applied to even number of directors
and court would not dissolve because there were 3 directors) ; Bowman v. Gum,
Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 184 At. 258 (1936); McKay v. Beard, 20 S. C. 156 (1882)
(refusal of one of the two incorporators-stockholders to be bound by the by-laws
did not work a dissolution); Hammond v. Hammond, 216 S. W. 2d 630 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1949).
"Dissension, then, would seem not to be an independent ground for dissolution
but rather a contributing element to the factual situation necessary for relief on
one of the other grounds." Note, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 714, 720 (1943).
See also: Anno. 13 A. L. R. 2d 1261 (1950).
'Saltz v. Saltz Bros., 84 F. 2d 246, cert. denied, 299 U. S. 567 (1936) ; Vale
v. Atlantic Coast and Inland Corp., - Del. Ch. -, 99 A. 2d 396 (1953) (no
specific deadlock statute but court held the complaint sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss.
But see Hall v. Woods, 325 II. 114, 156 N.E. 258 (1927). In this case the
court held that part of the stock, owned by a foreign corporation, cannot be voted
and therefore there is no deadlock. On a petition to rehear, the court suggested
how such stock could be voted but then said that it would not anticipate a dead-
lock (which would occur whenever the excluded stock was allowed a vote).
' Cases cited note 3 supra; BALANTINE, CoaRoarONS § 304 (Rev. ed., 1946);
16 FLETcHER, CYC. CORORATION S § 8080 and § 8098 (Rev. ed. 1942); STmvNs,
CoRPoRaTIONS § 199 (2nd ed., 1949) ; Note, 47 MicE. L. REv. 684 (1949).
8Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W. 2d 944 (1950); Guaranty
Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P. 2d 974 (1948) ; Application of
Radom, 282 App. Div. 854, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (1st Dep't 1953) (evidence did
not establish deadlock or frustration of corporate activities by lack of a board
of directors; dissolution denied).
But under statutes which state that corporations may be dissolved "for good
cause shown," courts have refused to dissolve on the mere fact of deadlock alone.
Gidwitz v. Cohn, 238 Ill. App. 227 (1925) ; Platner v. Kirby, 138 Iowa 259, 115
N.W. 1032 (1908).
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suffer,7 or where the court says that these corporations are mere part-
nerships.8  Notwithstanding these more liberal interpretations of appli-
cable laws or of equitable jurisdiction without a particular law, there
is still a need for definite statutory authority in this field.
The present state of the North Carolina law on this point is in
doubt. The relevant statutes set out various methods of involuntary
dissolution at the instance of private persons,9 stockholders, 0 or the
Attorney-General," but in the opinion of writers on the subject, these
statutes are not specific enough to encompass the problem at hand'2
Therefore an examination of pertinent corporation laws in other states
is necessary in order to be able to formulate a suggested addition to
Chapter 55 of the General Statutes.
Some states merely give their equity courts the power to dissolve
corporations "whenever any good and sufficient reason exists,"' 3 or
when liquidation is "reasonably necessary for the protection of the
rights of the stockholders or creditors."'14 In this writer's opinion,
such statutes are far from adequate for the reason that these courts
tend to give an undue amount of weight to various factors such as
'Petition of Collins-Doan Co. 3 N. J. 382, 70 A. 2d 159 (1949) ; Application
of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949); Re Waldorf
Amusement Co., 13 Ohio App. 438 (1928).I Flemming v. Heffner-Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1933);
Green v. National Advertising and Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056
(1917). Note, 22 V. L. R.v. 469, 470 (1936).
Israels, Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Ci. L. REv. 778, 792 (1952), ad-
vances the theory of considering the participants in a stalemated close corporation
as joint venturers as between themselves.
Contra: Freedman v. Fox, -Fla.-, 67 So. 2d 692 (1953); Cohen v. Wacht,
-Misc.-, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 207 (Sup. Ct. 1953).0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-124 (1950).
'
0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1950).
'
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-126 (1950) which provides in part:
..... It is the duty of the Attorney General, whenever he has reason to
believe that any.of these acts or omissions can be established by proof, to bring
an action in every case of public interest, and also it every other case in which
satisfactory security is given to indemnify the state. . . " (italics added)
In response to a North Carolina attorney's contention that the Attorney Gen-
eral was required under this clause to bring action in a situation where two per-
sons each owned 50% of the stock and could not elect a third director, the
Attorney General replied; ". . . I do not think that it would be proper for me
to authorize one of the parties in the controversy to institute an action in the
name of the Attorney General." Letter from Attorney-General, Aug. 12, 1953.
A subsequent letter states that "I am not satisfied that the failure of the
tlirectors . . .to agree upon . . . a third director . . . would in itself justify
an action to dissolve. . . ." The Attorney General then suggests that it might
be possible to proceed under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-114 (1950), but this gives
the court the right to contime the corporation whereas in the majority of cases,
a dissolution is desired. Letter from Attorney-General, Aug. 20, 1953.
1 Israels, Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 CI. L. REv. 778 (1952). The writer
in Note, 28 N. C. LAw REv. 313, 315 (1950), discusses in some detail the rele-
vant North Carolina cases on involuntary dissolution and concludes that ". . . all
the presently appropriate circumstances for dissolution are not covered by statute
in North Carolina." Supra at 318.
"t CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5226 (1949).
11 N. H. REV. LAws c. 274, § 96 (1942).
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solvency 15 or impossibility of carrying out corporate purpose,', and do
not squarely face the issue of paralysis in the management because of
a deadlock.
Other legislatures have adopted the provision set out in the Model
Business Corporation Act.'7 Even this paragon was elaborated upon
by some states which adopted the Model Act clause verbatim and then
supplemented it with additional sections pertaining not only to director
deadlocks but also to situations where no new directors can be elected
because of a stockholder deadlock which has extended over a period of
time, usually two successive annual meetings. 18 Consequently, the
Model Act was amended in 1952 so as to include this additional pro-
vision.19
Another group of states have statutes 20 derived from the New York
General Corporation Law, the pertinent section of which is as follows:
* .. If a corporation has an even number of directors who are
equally divided respecting the management of its affairs, or if
the votes of its stockholders are so 'divided that they cannot elect
a Board of Directors, the holders of one-half of the stock . . .
may present a verified petition for dissolution .... 21
1" The Mississippi Statute specifically provides for liquidation if the corpora-
tion ". . . ceases to be a going concern." Miss. CODE ANN. § 5355 (1942).
16 Olechny v. Thadeus Kosciuszko Society, 128 Conn. 534, 24 A. 2d 249 (1942)
(dissolution denied, but the court admitted that the test to be applied was im-
possibility of corporate purpose).
17 MODEL BUSINESS CoRORaTrON AcT § 90 (1950) : "The courts shall have full
power to liquidate . . . a corporation . . . when it is established . . . that the
directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to
the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 301.49 (West 1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485 (Vernon 1949);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2852-1107 (1938).16ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 57.86 (Supp. 1952) ; Wimp Packing Co. v. Wimp,
313 Ill. App. 262, 39 N. E. 2d 720 (1942) ; Wiedoeft v. Frank Holton & Co., 294
Ill. App. 118, 13 N. E. 2d 854 (1938) (statute to be strictly construed); Wis.
STAT. § 180.771 (1951), as amended by Wis. Laws 1953, c. 399, §§ 49, 50.
Of the laws examined, the California statute seems to the writer to meet the
situation most adequately. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4651 (1948).
1" "The courts shall have full power to liquidate..,. a corporation . .. when
it is established . . . that the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and
have failed, for a period which includes at least two annual meeting dates, to
elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired
upon the election of their successors .. " MODEL BusiNESS CORPORATION Aar
§ 90 (1952 Revision).
2 FLA. LAws 1953, § 608.28, p. 631; Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.570 (1948), as
amended by Ky. Laws 1952, c. 116; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.55 (1950); N. J.
REv. STAT. § 14:13-15 (Supp. 1953); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 1701.94 (1938);
WASH. REv. CODE § 23:44:030 (1952).
'IN. Y. GENERAL CORPORATIoN LAW § 103 (Supp. 1953). It is to be noted
that this statute does not say "irreparable damage" like the Model Act, but as
construed by the New York Courts, this statute is to be read in connection with
N. Y. General Corporation Law § 117 which states that the dissolution must be
beneficial to the stockholders. It has been held that this test is not met when
the corporation is financially sound. Re Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N. Y. S.
2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949).
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But even with the above type of statute, the decisions show that
the courts are still overly conscious of the old rule, and therefore tend
to construe strictly the applicable statute.22  For example, the New
York Court has denied dissolution in cases where the evidence did
not establish that corporate activities were frustrated by lack of a board
of directors,2 where dissolution would not be in the best interest of
the stockholders,24 and where it was claimed that there was in fact an
existing deadlock and one of the three directors was merely a "dummy"
who refused to act.25  Therefore it would seem that any proposed
statute should be -definite enough to meet the deadlock situation in
general, while retaining sufficient elasticity to enable the court adequately
to cope with specific problems which might arise.
The North Carolina General Statutes Commission has drafted a
deadlock statute as part of a revised corporation law for submission to
the 1955 General Assembly. The latest draft of this proposed law
would give the superior court the power to liquidate a corporation when
it is established that:
(1) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs and the stockholders are unable to break the
deadlock, so that the business can no longer be conducted
to the advantage of all the shareholders; or
(2) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and for
that reason have been unable at two consecutive annual
meetings to elect successors to directors whose term had
expired; . . .
This proposal is an adoption of the present Illinois statute,2 6 with
the exception of the last clause in subsection (1), which has been
changed from the Illinois requirement of actual or threatened "irre-
parable injury to the corporation." This change is a commendable
one because presumably the inclusion of the phrase "to the advantage
of all of the shareholders" would give the court, in its discretion, power
2Wimp Packing Co. v. Wimp, 313 Ill. App. 262, 39 N. E. 2d 720 (1942);
In re Belton, 47 La. 1614, 18 So. 642 (1896) (failure to elect officers does not work
a dissolution) ; Dorf v. Hill Bus. Co., 140 N. J. Eq. 444, 54 A. 2d 761 (1947).
But see In re Evening Journal Ass'n, 15 N. J. Super. 58, 83 A. 2d 38 (1951)
(the test used here was not solvency but whether or not there was a corporate
paralysis).
"Application of Radom, 282 App. Div. 854, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (1st Dep't
1953).
2, Application of Numode Realty Co., Inc., 278 App. Div. 979, 105 N. Y. S.
2d 588 (2nd Dep't 1951).
"'Petition of Binder, 172 Misc. 634, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1939), re-
versed without opinion, 258 App. Div. 1041, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 1020 (1st Dep't 1940)(remanded with instructions for referee to find out whether the third director
was in fact a "dummy").
"ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 57.86 (Supp. 1952).
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to liquidate even a solvent concern if the internal dissension reached
a point where such action would be the only feasible solution. It was
presumably the intention of the Drafting Committee that by making
the above change, the North Carolina courts will be able to take a
more liberal attitude than has the Supreme Court of Illinois2 7 under
their similar statute.
Subsection (1) of the proposed statute seems very adequately to
provide a solution in any director deadlock situation. This section also!
seems applicable to stockholder deadlocks by the clause "and the stock-
holders are unable to break the deadlock. ' 28  The need for specific
reference to stockholder deadlock is vividly brought out in the case of
Cook v. Cook29 where, although there was a 50-50 stock division, the
applicable statute dealt with director deadlocks and therefore relief
was denied.
If however the situation should arise where there is an uneven split
among directors, but the stockholders become deadlocked so that it
is impossible to elect a new board, then subsection (2) could be put
into use.
The California30 and West Virginia3 1 statutes have an additional
section which in essence allows the defendant stockholders, if they wish
to prevent dissolution,,to purchase the plaintiff's stock at a fair market
value set by the court. In the opinion of this writer, the above pro-
vision, which would preserve the going concern and possibly prevent
hardship to some defendants, is an excellent addition and serious thought
should be given as to the possibility and advisability of incorporating
it into the new proposal.
The need for this statute is amply shown by case law on the subject
and the fact that four states, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Wis-
consin, following the example set by the recent change in the Model
Act, adopted similar laws or amended old laws at the last meeting of
their legislatures. In order to clarify the vague and inadequate state
of the North Carolina law on involuntary dissolution, it is hoped that
2 Lush'us Brand Lithograph Co. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 330 Ill.
App. 216, 70 N. E. 2d 737 (1946) (statute to be strictly construed).
" This writer is convinced that the proposed statute would be a sufficient
remedy for any conceivable deadlock situation, but should there be any doubt
as to its applicability to stockholder deadlocks, the California Code has a perti-
nent section which provides for dissolution if "there is internal dissension and
two or more factors of shareholders in the corporation are so deadlocked that
its business cannot be conducted with advantage to its shareholders." CAL. Corn.
CoD § 4651(d) (1948).
270 Mass. 534, 170 N. E. 455 (1930). After this case the Massachusetts
statute was amended, to include the clause "or if the votes of its stockholders are
equally divided in the election of directors." See also: Wimp Packing Co. v.
Wimp, 313 Ill. App. 262, 39 N. E. 2d 720 (1942) ; In. re Hedberg-Freidheim Co.,
233 Minn. 534, 47 N. W. 2d 424 (1951).
'o CAL. CoRp. CODE ANN. § 4658 (1948).
*
1W. VA. CODE AxN. § 3093 (1949).
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the next legislature will give careful consideration to the proposed cor-
poration laws, with special emphasis on a remedy for the deadlock
situation.
R. C. VAUGHN, JR.
Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Coverage of Maintenance
Employees of Office Buildings
Maintenance employees in office buildings present a real problem
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their employer is frequently
a corporation whose sole business is that of renting space in local build-
ings, although the employer may be a manufacturing company or a bank
using a part of the building for its own offices and renting the balance.
Where all or part of the building is rented, the tenants may be engaged
in purely local business, or in interstate commerce either on or off the
premises, or in the production of goods for commerce either in the build-.
ing or at another location. The maintenance employees themselves sel-
dom have any direct contact with the carrying on of interstate commerce
or with the physical production of goods for commerce. They clean the
building, operate the elevators, make repairs, guard and heat the prem-
ises, and perform a variety of other activities admittedly essential to
the successful operation of the modern office building. The question
which arises in each case, however, is whether such activities are so
closely related to commerce or production of goods for commerce as
to bring the maintenance employees under the coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
Coverage under the act is dependent on the activities of the em-
ployee rather than on the business of the employer. Thus the employees
may be under the act even though the employer is a local real estate
firm and therefore clearly not engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce.' On the other hand, the employees may not
be covered even though their employer is engaged in commerce. 2
Any employee is covered who is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce,3 the latter including any closely
related process or occupation directly essential to the production of
goods for commerce. 4 In this connection it is necessary to distinguish
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
Carrigan v. Provident Trust Co., 153 F. 2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1946); Building
Service Employees International Union v. Trenton Trust Co., 142 F. 2d 257
(3rd Cir. 1944).
'52 STAT. 1062, 1063 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §§ 206, 207 (1946), as amended,
63 STAT. 912 (1949), 29 U. S. C. §§ 206, 207 (Supp. 1953). See LIVENGOOD, THE
FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LA v (American Law Institute 1952); Tyson, The
Fair Labor Standard Avwndments of 1949, 28 N. C. L. REv. 161 (1950).
'52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT.
911 (1949), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1953).
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between "engaged in commerce" on the one hand and "in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce" on the other.
The courts have narrowly construed the phrase "engaged in com-
merce" and have not extended the act to cover maintenance employees
whose only connection with interstate commerce is that they work in the
same building in which tenants are engaged in commerce.5 Thus in the
recent case of Tobin v. Girard Properties, Inc.6 where the major part
of the building was rented to a telephone company for its executive
offices, the court found that the maintenance employees were not engaged
in commerce. Also, in the early bank cases the courts held that even
though the employer-bank might be engaged in commerce, the work of
the maintenance employees was not closely enough related to bring the
employees under the act.7
The phrase "production of goods for commerce" has been given a
much more liberal meaning. The basis for this distinction is in the
act itself. As to production of goods for commerce, the act specifically
states that it includes not only the employees who are employed in
producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any
manner working on the goods, but also those employed in any closely
related process or occupation directly essential to the production of
goods,8 or, prior to the 1949 amendment, those necessary to the pro-
duction of such goods. Commerce is defined as trade, commerce, trans-
Tobin v. Girard Properties, Inc., 206 F. 2d 524 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Blumenthal
v. Girard Trust Co., 141 F. 2d 849 (3rd Cir. 1944); Johnson v. Masonic Building
Co., 138 F. 2d 817 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 780 (1943) ; Rucker v.
First National Bank of Miami, 138 F. 2d 699 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U. S. 769 (1943); Rosenberg v. Semeria, 137 F. 2d 742 (9th Cir. 1943), cerl.
denied, 320 U. S. 770 (1943); Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development Co.,
132 F. 2d 287 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 790 (1942) ; Wideman v.
Blanchard & Calhoun Realty Co., 50 F. Supp. 626 (S. D. Ga. 1943); Hinkler v.
Eighty-Three Maiden Lane Corp., 50 F. Supp. 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); In re
New York Title & Mortgage Co., 179 Misc. 789, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 893 (Sup. Ct.
1943); Greene v. Anchor Mills Co., 224 N. C. 714, 32 S. E. 2d 341 (1944),
cert denied, 324 U. S. 880 (1945); Robinson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 158 S. W. 2d 441 (Tenn. 1941).
6 Tobin v. Girard Properties, Inc., 206 F. 2d 524 (5th Cir. 1953).
Building Service Employees International Union v. Trenton Trust Co., 142
F. 2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1944); Convey v. Omaha National Bank, 140 F. 2d 640
(8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 781 (1944) ; Rucker v. First National
Bank of Miami, 138 F. 2d 699 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 769
(1943); Lofther v. First National Bank of Chicago, 138 F. 2d 299 (7th Cir.
1943); Brandell v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 43 F. Supp.
781 (N. D. Il. 1941); Fultz v. United States Trust Co., 302 Ky. 493, 195 S. W.
2d 87 (1946); Stoike v. First National Bank, 290 N. Y. 195, 48 N. E. 2d 482
(1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 762 (1943) ; Connelly v. Hamilton National Bank,
182 Tenn. 77, 184 S. W. 2d 173 (1944). But cf. Walling v. Bank of Wanesboro,
61 F. Supp. 384 (S. D. Ga. 1945) where janitor also served as messenger for
the bank and was considered as engaged in interstate commerce.
152 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT,
911 (1949), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1953).
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portation, transmission, or communication 9 and no specific extension is
made to occupations or processes directly essential thereto.
An interesting illustration of the difference in construction of the
two phrases is afforded by the bank cases. Those cases in which the
sole issue was whether the employees were engaged in commerce held
that although the bank was engaged in commerce, the maintenance
employees were not closely enough related to be brought under the
act.' 0 In the later cases, however, where it was found that the bank
was engaged in the production of goods for commerce, maintenance
employees were found to be covered by the act.'
Maintenance employees are almost never found to be actually pro-
ducing or physically handling the goods being produced for commerce.
The question is almost always one of whether they are engaged in
activities "necessary to" or since 1949, "directly essential to" production
of goods for commerce. In order to determine this, it is necessary to
look not only at the activities of the employee but also at the activities
of the employer and of the tenant, where these activities are performed,
the number and nature of intervening processes between the activity and
the actual physical production, and the characteristics and purposes of
the employer's business. 12
The cases involving maintenance employees allegedly engaged in
the production of goods for commerce fall into three groups:
(1) Where a substantial part of the building is rented to tenants who
are engaged in the production of goods for commerce in the building it-
self, the maintenance employees are covered, even though the employer
is a local real estate firm. This was established by the U. S. Supreme
Court in Kirschbaum v. Walling in 1942,13 and has been applied in
numerous cases since.14 Even though the employees do not handle the
0 Ibid, § 203(b).
10 See note 7 supra.
"Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir.
1953); Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
"529 CODE FED. REGS. § 776.17(c) (1950).
13316 U. S. 517 (1942).14D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946); Brooklyn Say. Bank v.
O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 (1945); Grant v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 172 F. 2d
109 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir.
1946); Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767 (1945) ; Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 441
(2d Cir. 1944); Merryfield v. F. M. Hoyt Shoe Corp., 128 F. 2d 452 (1st Cir.
1942); Asselta v. 149 Madison Avenue Corp., 65 F. Supp. 385 (S. D. N. Y.
1945); Frank v. McMeekan, 56 F. Supp. 369 (E. D. N. Y. 1944); Bittner v.
Chicago Daily News Printing Co., 4 W. H. Cases (BNA) 837 (N. D. Il. 1944);
Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Spaeth v.
Washington University, 213 S. W. 2d 276 (Mo. 1948) ; Quest v. George A. Bow-
man, Inc., 64 N. Y. S. 2d 60 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946) ; Rienzo v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 183 Misc. 153, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Schineck v. 386
Fourth Ave. Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944);
Floyd v. 58-64 Fortieth Street Corp., 44 N. Y. S. 2d 422 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943).
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goods produced, their maintenance work is considered to have such a
close and immediate tie with the process of production that they are
considered to be engaged in an occupation necessary to the production
of goods for commerce. Although the Kirschbaum case was decided
before the 1949 amendment which changed "necessary to" to "directly
essential to" legislative history' 5 and administrative statements'0 have
indicated that no change was intended by this amendment. In the
recent decision of Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin'7 the'
8th Circuit expressly followed the Kirschbaum case and indicated that
the 1949 amendment had made no change. The Union National Bank
case, however, was a stronger case for coverage since the employer him-
self was found to be engaged in the production of goods for commerce
in the building whereas in the Kirschbaum case it was the tenants who
were producing the goods.
(2) Where the building is owned by a business which is engaged
in the production of goods for commerce and is used at least in part
for its executive offices, the maintenance employees are covered by the
act. Thus in Borden v. Borella,'8 although there was no physical pro-
duction of goods in the office building itself, the court felt that since
the employer-owner was himself engaged in the production of goods
for commerce at another location and used this building for directing
and controlling that production, the maintenance employees were en-
gaged in an occupation necessary to such production. These employees,
the court pointed out, would have been covered had the offices been
in the same building with the manufacturing establishment. The office,
even though at another location, was a part of an integrated effort for
the production of goods and to'make a distinction based on the mere
fact that the office was physically separated from the plant was econom-
ically unjustifiable.
This case was followed and in fact extended by the recent case of
General Electric v. Porter" where the 9th Circuit held the act covered
firemen employed by General Electric in a company-owned town in
which the executive offices of the plant were located although the plant
which was producing goods for commerce was several miles away.
Whether the Supreme Court will uphold such an extension in the light
of the 1949 amendments remains to be seen.
(3) In those buildings in which there is no substantial production
of goods for commerce in the building but in which there are tenants,
H. R. RP.. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2253 (1949).
"'Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953), WAGE & HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 10:295
(1953).
.7207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir. 1953).
s 325 U. S. 679 (1945).
19 208 F. 2d 805 (9th Cir. 1953).
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as distinguished from the owner, who are engaged in the production of
goods for commerce at another location, the maintenance employees
are not covered. In Ten East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus2° the
U. S. Supreme Court by a five to four decision held that the employees
were too far removed from the actual production of goods for com-
merce to be included even within that phrase "necessary to the pro-
duction." Renting office space in a building devoted to an unrestricted
variety of office work, said the majority of the court, spontaneously
satisfied common understanding of what is local business and made
the employees of such a building engaged in local business. The dis-
sent felt that the connection with the production of goods here was
as close as that in the Borden case which was decided on the same day,
that coverage depended on the work of the employees which in the two
cases was the same, and that the mere chance of whether the employee
was employed by the producer of the goods or by the independent
owner of the building should make no difference.
As the 1949 amendment was intended to restrict the coverage of
the act and these employees were excluded even before that amend-
ment, the amendment cannot, of course, further restrict coverage in
these cases.
Since whether maintenance employees in these cases are covered
by the act depends on the production of goods for commerce either
by the owner or the tenants, it is necessary to examine just what activi-
ties are considered by the courts to be production.
The act defines "produced" as "produced, manufactured, mined,
handled, or in any other manner worked on," 2' and "goods" as "goods,
wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or subjects of commerce
of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof. '22  The actual
manufacture of such tangible items as women's clothes, watches, or
jewelry is, of course, clearly production of goods.23 "Produced," how-
ever, has also been held to cover the process of issuing insurance
policies, 24 mimeographing news bulletins,25 preparing advertising plates
2 325 U. S. 578 (1945).
2152 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT.
911 (1949), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1953).
Ibid. § 203(i) ; 29 CODE FED. R.Gs. § 776.20 (1950).
"D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946) ; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316
U. S. 517 (1942) ; Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. Zd 958 (2d Cir. 1946).
" Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir. 1953)(branch office); Darr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 871 (1948). Contra: Hinkler v. Eighty-Three Maiden
Lane Corp., 50 F. Supp. 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
" Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Baldwin v. Emigrant Indus-
trial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767
(1945); Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
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and copy, 26 editing and proofreading scripts for books and motion pic-
tures,2 7 and publishing a newspaper.28 The more recent cases have
held that banks by issuing or authenticating bonds, stocks, notes, or
drafts are engaged in the production of goods for commerce.29  Lawyers
or brokers, however, are not producing goods merely because they
draw deeds or write letters that are sent through the mails into another
state.30
Production of goods also includes handling. Repacking and re-
labeling goods have been held to be production,8 ' as have receiving and
shipping them.3 2  Other cases have held that repacking or shipping by
a jobber who did not manufacture the goods is not production.8 3
A tenant may be producing goods for commerce even though he
sell to local concerns. It is enough if he knows or has reason to know
that his products are to be shipped in interstate commerce.3 4
The amount of production for commerce in the building must be
substantial for the maintenance employees to be covered by the act. The
statute gives no definition of "substantial," but the administrator and
most of the courts adopted 20 per cent as a rough guide; that is, where
the tenants producing goods for commerce occupied more than 20 per
cent of the floor space, the maintenance employees were covered,3 5 and
2 Asselta v. 149 Madison Avenue Corp., 65 F. Supp. 385 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) ;
Schineck v. 386 Fourth Ave. Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1944).
217 Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Baldwin v.
Emigrant Industrial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 767 (1945).
"Bittner v. Chicago Daily News Printing Co., 4 W. H. Cases (BNA) 837
(N. D. I1. 1944).
" Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir.
1953) ; Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946). But cf.:
Holmes v. Elizabeth Trust Co., 72 F. Supp. 182 (D. N. J. 1947).
'°Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946); Wideman v.
Blanchard & Calhoun Realty Co., 50 F. Supp. 626 (S. D. Ga. 1943).
"Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps
Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946); Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Trust
Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767 (1945);
Spaeth v. Washington University, 213 S. W. 2d 276 (Mo. 1948); Schineck v.
386 Fourth Ave. Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944).32 Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 441 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Holmes v. Elizabeth TrustCo., 72 F. Supp. 182 (D. N. J. 1947).
"22Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Blumenthal v. Girard Trust
Co., 141 F. 2d 849 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Prescott v. Broadway & Franklin Street Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 272 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Burke v. Hide & Leather Realty Co., 182
Misc. 319, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
" 328 U. S. 108 (1946).
B 5 Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946) (48%);
Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767 (1945) (39%) ; Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 444 (2d
Cir. 1944) (25%); Frank v. McMeekan, 56 F. Supp. 369 (E. D. N. Y. 1944)
(76%); Bittner v. Chicago Daily News Printing Co., 4 W. H. Cases (BNA)
837 (N. D. Ill. 1944) (46%) ; Asselta v. 149 Madison Avenue Corp., 65 F. Supp.
385 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) (24%); Quest v. George A. Bowman, Inc., 64 N. Y. S.
2d 60 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946) (more than 20%); Schineck v. 386 Fourth Ave.
Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944) (50%).
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where such tenants occupied less than 20 per cent, maintenance em-
ployees were not covered.3 6 Other courts said little or nothing about
percentages.37  Under the new 1953 Administrative Statement, the
20 per cent rule has been retained for buildings where tenants are
"manufacturing" on the premises.
38
A tenant either is or is not engaged in the production of goods for
commerce; that is, either all or none of his floor space is counted. In
determining whether any single tenant is producing goods for com-
merce, the trial courts have considered the percentage of space, the
percentage of employees actually engaged on the premises in physical
production of goods, and the relation of production for interstate com-
merce to the total production.
39
Some courts have interpreted the 20 per cent rule as applying to
this determination of whether the tenant is engaged in commerce.
40
Other courts have held that it is not necessary to have 20 per cent,
41
the 2nd Circuit court holding in one case that 2 per cent of the income
of one tenant and 5 per cent of the floor space of another were sufficient
to classify these tenants as engaged in the production of goods for
commerce. 42  Thus if 20 per cent of the total floor space of the building
is being occupied by firms producing goods for commerce but each of
those firms is devoting only 5 percent of its own floor space to that
production it would be possible for the maintenance employees to be
covered even though only 1 per cent of the total floor space in the build-
ing were actually devoted to production.
Where a building owned by a producer of goods for commerce is
occupied as its executive offices, the courts have simply indicated that
if maintenance employees are to be covered by the act the building must
be "predominantly" occupied for its offices. 43 In the Borden case this
requirement was met where 58 per cent of the area was so used, al-
t*Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949) (15%); Hunter v. Madison
Avenue Corp., 174 F. 2d 164 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 836 (1949)
(3%); Johnson v. Great National Life Insurance Co., 166 S. W. 2d 935 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942) (8%); In re New York Title & Mortgage Co., 179 Misc. 789,
39 N. Y. S. 2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (10%).
'7 Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Hinkle
v. Frank Nelson Bldg. Inc., 245 Ala. 679, 18 So. 2d 374 (1944); Baum v. A. C.
Office Bldg. Co., 157 Kan. 558, 143 P. 2d 417 (1943); Spaeth v. Washington
University, 213 S. W. 2d 276 (Mo. 1948).
"
8Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953) WAGE & HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 10: 295
(1953).
" Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps
Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp.
875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
, Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 441 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave.
Corp., 65 F. Supp. 385 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
"'Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps
Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946).
"' Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946).
"'Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679 (1945).
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though there was no discussion as to what percentage would be con-
sidered "predominantly" occupied.
Where a bank occupies part of the building, the courts have indi-
cated that the maintenance employees will be covered if the proportion
of goods produced is enough to "color the activities of the employees
as a whole." 44  Here again the courts have not interpreted "enough
to color" but have held 50 per cent in one case" and 80 per cent in
another sufficient.4 6  The new administrative rulings on the latter two
points are not wholly clear.4
7
Until 1949, coverage of the act had gradually spread to include
more and more maintenance employees. The Kirschbaum case in 1942
extended it to maintenance employees of independent real estate com-
panies if the tenants were engaged in the production of goods for
commerce. The Borden case in 1945 brought within the coverage of
the act maintenance employees in office buildings owned by producers
of goods for interstate commerce and used by them for their executive
offices. The Martino case" in 1946 extended coverage to employees
of a local window washing firm who worked only temporarily on the
premises of a plant producing goods for interstate commerce. The
Gangi case49 in the same year made it clear that employees in buildings
where the tenants produced goods which were not sold directly in inter-
state commerce but which the tenant had reason to believe would go
into interstate commerce were within the act.
Extension took place also in another form. More and more types
of activities were considered by the courts as production of goods for
commerce. Banking activities, for example, which at first were assumed
to be merely interstate commerce were later held to be production of
goods for commerce. In the later cases, too, there is a great deal more
judicial investigation into the activities of the tenants.
The 1949 amendment by changing "necessary" to "directly essential"
was intended to restrict coverage under the act. The House Conference
Report 5° indicated, however, that the changes were not intended to
remove from the act the maintenance employees of manufacturers and
other producers of goods for commerce and that employees engaged in
such maintenance work would remain subject to the act even though
"Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
45 Ibid.
"8 Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir.
1953).
*1 'Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953) WAGE & HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 10: 295(1953).8 artino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S. 173 (1946).
"D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946).
C I "H. R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2253 (1949); Sanders, Basic
Coverage of the Amended Federal Wage and Hour Law, 3 VAND. L. R. 175(1950).
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they were employed by an independent employer. Such activities were
closely related and directly essential to the production of goods for
commerce. Maintenance employees like those in the Martino case,
however, were to be removed from the act.
The first Interpretative Bulletin issued after the 1949 amendment
was in such general terms that it threw little light on the policies to
be followed with regard to maintenance employeesY1 A more detailed
administrative policy was announced in a statement dated December
8, 1953.r2 The statement expressly excluded consideration of mainte-
nance employees of manufacturers, processors, mining companies, banks,
or insurance companies engaged in producing goods for interstate com-
merce since, according to the statement, it is well established that they
are covered by the act.
The statement indicates that:
Employees of office buildings housing the usual miscellany of of-
fices, including doctors, dentists, lawyers, etc., and also various small
enterprises such as local watch repair, branch telegraph offices, etc.,
as well as executive and sales offices of manufacturing and mining com-
panies where these offices are a part of the general miscellany are not
considered covered by the act. This is apparently the situation that
existed in the Callus case and represents no change.
Employees of loft buildings occupied exclusively by tenants engaged
on the premises in manufacturing goods for interstate commerce are
considered covered by the act. This is the strongest type of Kirsch-
baum case.
Employees of buildings occupied partly by producers and partly by
offices will be covered or not depending on the percentage of certain
activities in the buildings. If 20 per cent or more of the rentable area
is used by tenants engaged on the premises in the manufacture of goods
for commerce, the maintenance employees of the building will be cov-
ered by the act. This is the usual Kirschbaum situation with the same
20 per cent rule previously used.
If 50 per cent or more of the rentable area of the building is occupied
by the executive offices of a manufacturer or mining company, the
maintenance employees of the building will be covered. This state-
ment in its ambiguity raises several questions. Does this 50 per cent
policy apply only to buildings where the manufacturer owns the build-
ing but occupies only part of its as its executive offices, as in the Borden
case where the manufacturer occupied 58 per cent of the floor space but
the court in holding the employees under the act made no point of the
5129 CoDE FED. REs. §§ 776.0-776.21.
"
2Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953) WAGE: & HouR MANUAL (BNA) 10:295
(1953).
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percentage involved? Or does it apply only to buildings owned by an
independent real estate firm and occupied by a manufacturer for its
executive offices, as in the Callus case where 26 per cent of the building
was used for executive offices but the majority of the court in denying
coverage did not base its decision on the percentage of the space so
used? Or is the administrator announcing that ownership of the build-
ing is immaterial and that he views the distinction between the Borden
and the Callus case as one of percentages and not one of ownership of
the building? In the light of the language of the statement it would
appear that the administrator is saying that if 50 per cent of the build-
ing is rented by a tenant for executive offices from which he controls
his manufacturing of goods for commerce, then those offices are not
a part of the "usual miscellany" and thus are not within the rule of
the Callus case.
If 50 per cent or more of the rentable'area is occupied by a bank or
insurance company, the maintenance employees will be covered. This
raises the same question, that is, whether this applies to situations where
the bank or insurance company owns the building or to situations where
an independent real estate company owns the building or to both situa-
tions.
Of the three Circuit court cases decided since the 1949 amendment,
no restriction of coverage has been indicated. The Girard case in deny-
ing coverage to employees in a building the major part of which had
been rented for offices by a company engaged in commerce simply
followed the earlier cases denying coverage because there was not a
sufficiently close connection with interstate commerce. That part of
the statute relating to "engaged in commerce" was not changed by the
amendment. The Union National Bank case in holding the maintenance
employees covered by the act relied on the Kirschbaum case and indi-
cated that no change was intended by the amendment. The case, how-
ever, was a stronger one for coverage than the Kirschbaum case because
the employer was himself engaged in the production of goods for inter-
state commerce. The General Electric case extended rather than re-
stricted the doctrine of the Borden case. None of these cases, however,
has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. The only district court
case pointing toward a possible restriction held that the act did not
cover a watchman employed to guard the outside of buildings rented to
tenants producing goods for commerce.r3 No cases, of course, have
reached the courts since the announcement of the 1953 Administrative
Statement.
judging from the limited number of court decisions and from the
"Tobin v. Famous Realty, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 659 (E. D. N. Y. 1953).
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administrative interpretations it would appear that little restriction
of coverage of maintenance employees was effected by the 1949 amend-
ment. The real effect of the amendment will not be known definitely
until some case in these borderline areas reaches the Supreme Court.
Until then it is probable that coverage under the act will not only be
materially restricted but that it will continue to be extended in spite of
the amendment.
JEANNE OWEN
Sales-Warranties-Implied in Sale of Food for Human Consumption
In the recent case of Draughon v. Maddox1 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that in the sale of a cow at auction on a public
market to a retail dealer there was an implied warranty that it was
fit for human consumption. The court relied on two earlier North
Carolina cases in which it was held (1) that there was an implied
warranty that the article sold was suitable for the purpose intended2
and (2) that there was an implied warranty in the sale of food for
human consumption that it was wholesome and fit for that purpose.8
Relying on the statute requiring a health certificate with a cow if not
sold for immediate slaughter,4 the court found that this cow, sold with-
out a health certificate, must have been intended for immediate slaugh-
ter and therefore for human consumption.
The North Carolina cases on implied warranty of fitness for the
purpose intended are not wholly consistent. In the early case of Dick-
son v. Jordan5 the court had held that there was no implied warranty
of quality even where the seller knew the purpose for which the article
was to be used, basing the decision on the fact that since the same price
was paid by the one who did not reveal'his purpose as by the one who
did, there was no consideration to support a warranty of fitness.
Some doubt must have been cast on this rule by the decision in
Thomas v. Simpson0 where the seller who contracted to furnish shingles
was denied recovery because they were not fit for the purpose intended.
The court did not mention the earlier case. Then in a dictum in a
much later case, the court again said that if there was a sale for a
particular purpose, the seller warranted the article to be fit for that
purpose.7
One year after that dictum, however, there was a 'direct holding
237 N. C. 742, 75 S. E. 2d 917 (1953).
'McConnell v. Jones, 228 N. C. 218, 44 S. E. 2d 876 (1947).
'Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951).
'N. C. GFN. STAT. § 106-409 (1952).
'33 N. C. (11 Ired.) 166, 53 Am. Dec. 403 (1850).
80 N. C. 4 (1879).7 W. F. Main Co. v. Field, 144 N. C. 307, 311, 56 S. E. 943, 944 (1907).
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that there was no warranty where the seller knew the purpose unless
there was appropriate language to be a warranty.8 The court relied
on the Dickson case and stated that there were some cases where a
warranty would be implied, as where the article was manufactured for
a particular purpose, citing the Thonms case. By way of dictum two
years later, the court again stated that there would be no implied war-
ranty even where the seller knew the purpose for which the article
was intended.9
Since that time, the court has ignored these earlier cases denying
implied warranties and with a few exceptions1 ° has indicated that there
is an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose for which the article
is intended,11 the court frequently not making it clear whether the
warranty is one of suitability for general purposes or one of fitness
for a particular purpose. In some of these cases, the court has indicated
that if the article was wholly unfit for the purpose intended, there would
be a failure of consideration. 12
At times the rule as to implied warranty for fitness has been stated
so broadly that it could cover even those sales where the seller did not
know the intended purpose, although in all of the cases in which the
8 Woodridge v. Brown, 149 N. C. 299, 62 S. E. 1076 (1908).
'J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. McClamrock, 152 N. C. 405, 408, 67
S. E. 991, 992 (1910).
"0 Poovey v. International Sugar Co., 191 N. C. 722, 725, 133 S. E. 12, 13
(1926) (dictum that there is a warranty if the seller assures the buyer the article
is suitable); Hampton Guano Co. v. Hill Live-Stock Co., 168 N. C. 442, 447,
84 S. E. 774, 775 (1915) (dictum that there is no implied warranty of fitness).
"tDavis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) (salt substitute) ;
Stokes v. Edwards, 230 N. C. 306, 52 S. E. 2d 797 (1949) (oil burners); Mc-
Connell v. Jones, 228 N. C. 218, 44 S. E. 2d 876 (1947) (hay); Walker v.
Hickory Packing Co., 220 N. C. 158, 16 S. E. 2d 668 (1941) (lard); Primrose
Petroleum Co. v. Allen, 219 N. C. 461, 14 S. E. 2d 402 (1941) (written war-
ranty excluded any implied warranty as to fitness for a particular purpose) ; Wil-
liams v. Elson, 218 N. C. 157, 10 S. E. 2d 668 (1940) (sandwich); Aldridge
Motors, Inc. v. Alexander, 217 N. C. 750, 9 S. E. 2d 469 (1940) (automobile);
Pool v. Pinehurst, Inc., 215 N. C. 667, 2 S. E. 2d 871 (1939) (boiler condemned
by state authorities) ; Rabb v. Covington, 215 N. C. 572, 2 S. E. 2d 705 (1939)
(sausage); Williams v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 209 N. C. 29, 182 S. E. 719 (1935)
(automobile); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30
(1935) (flour; warranty recognized but held not to run from manufacturer to
ultimate consumer) ; Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N. C. 330, 135 S. E. 141 (1926)
(fertilizer); Standard Sand & Gravel Co. v. McClay, 191 N. C. 313, 131 S. E.
754 (1926) (gravel and sand); Swift & Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N. C. 162, 129
S. E. 453 (1925) (fertilizer); McCaskey Register Co. v. Bradshaw, 174 N. C.
414, 93 S. E. 898 (1917) (machines); Farquhar Co. v. Hardy Hardware Co.,
174 N. C. 369, 373, 93 S. E. 922, 924 (1917) (peanut pickers; dictum); Hall
Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 41, 85 S. E. 35 (1915) (hearse;
apparently warranty for general use only); Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy,
167 N. C. 427, 83 S. E. 567 (1914) (apparently warranty of merchantability only) ;
Ashford v. H. C. Schrader Co., 167 N. C. 45, 48, 83 S. E. 29, 31 (1914) (dictum).
1" Pool v. Pinehurst, Inc., 215 N. C. 667, 2 S. E. 2d 871 (1939) ( boiler con-
demned by state authorities); Williams v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 209 N. C. 29,
182 S. E. 719 (1935) (automobile) ; Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N. C. 330, 135
S. E. 141 (1926) (fertilizer).
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problem has arisen the seller actually knew.1 3  In only two of the-cases
was reliance of the buyer on the seller's skill or judgment expressly
made a factor to be considered in determihing whether there was an
implied warranty.' 4
Where the article sold is for human consumption, whether the North
Carolina court recognizes an implied warranty seems to depend upon
whether there is a contractual relation between the parties. Thus in
suits by the consumer against the retailer, North Carolina has recog-
nized an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption.15 Likewise
in suits by the retailer against his vendor, the court has recognized such
an implied warranty.16 But in suits by the ultimate consumer against
the manufacturer, the court has refused to recognize an action for breach
of implied warranty.1 7 Thus as between the vendee and his immediate
vendor, North Carolina has consistently allowed an action on implied
warranty of fitness for human consumption.
In most of these cases recognizing an implied warranty of fitness
for human consumption, the court apparently has based its decision
on the general rule of fitness for the use intended, although the court
in one case talked about the policy of preservation of public health 8
and by way of dictum in a case involving the sale of feed for cattle,
the court said that the rule was based on the public policy of regard
for human life.19
The decision in the instant case would appear to be consistent with
the more recent North Carolina cases both as to warranty of fitness for
the purpose intended and for human consumption. The inference seems
1 McConnell v. Jones, 228 N. C. 218, 44 S. E. 2d 876 (1947) ; Pool v. Pine-
hurst, Inc., 215 N. C. 667, 2 S. E. 2d 871 (1939); Williams v. Dixie Chevrolet
Co., 209 N. C. 29, 182 S. E. 719 (1935) ; Standard Sand & Gravel Co. v. McClay,
191 N. C. 313, 131 S. E. 754 (1926).
1 Stokes v. Edwards, 230 N. C. 306, 52 S. E. 2d 797 (1949) ; Poovey v. Inter-
national Sugar Co., 191 N. C. 722, 133 S. E. 12 (1926) (feed for cattle).
" Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) (salt substitute;
immediate issue was whether defendant-retailer could bring in his vendor as co-
defendant in suit on implied warranty); Williams v. Elson, 218 N. C. 157, 10
S. E. 2d 668 (1940) (sandwich) ; Rabb v. Covington, 215 N. C. 572, 2 S. E. 2d
705 (1939) (sausage).
1 Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C., 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) (salt substitute);
Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N. C. 158, 16 S. E. 2d 668 (1941) (lard);
Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy, 167 N. C. 427, 83 S. E. 567 (1914) (beans).
" Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935)
(flour) ; Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N. C. 105, 110, 16 S. E.
2d 680, 683 (1941) (tobacco; dictum); Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 208 N. C. 305, 307; 180 S. E. 582, 583 (1935) (bottled drinks; dictum).
In an earlier case the question was raised but the court found it unnecessary
to decide whether suit could be maintained on an implied warranty, since in
that case there was clearly negligence. Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co.,
171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916) (fish).
'
8 Rabb v. Covington, 215 N. C. 572, 574, 2 S. E. 2d 705, 707 (1939).
Poovey v. International Sugar Co., 191 N. C. 722, 724, 133 S. E. 12, 13
(1926); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935)
(dissenting opinion). -
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reasonable that since the cow was sold without a health certificate, the
seller must have contemplated that it was being bought for immediate
slaughter for human food. In many cases, however, as was pointed
out above, the court has stated the rule of implied warranties in such
a way as to imply that knowledge of the seller is not necessary.
20
Although the North Carolina court has put little stress on reliance
on the skill or judgment of the seller, two cases have indicated that such
reliance by the buyer was necessary.2 ' However, neither the instant
case nor the two cases cited in it as authority22 say anything about re-
liance of the buyer on the seller's skill and judgment. Apparently
in this case there was no reliance, since the cow was sold at auction on
a public market and both buyer and seller were experienced cattle
dealers.
While the Draughon v. Maddox decision seems consistent with re-
cent North Carolina cases, it is inconsistent with the weight of authority
in other states. Although a majority of the courts recognize an implied
warranty of fitness where the article is sold for a particular purpose,23
the rule applies only where the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judg-
ment.24  Under the Uniform Sales Act, also, such an implied warranty
for a particular purpose is recognized, but only if there is reliance by
the buyer.26  Generally, too, in sales at auction, there are no implied
warranties except as to title, the rule of caveat emptor being applied.
20
At common law there was also generally recognized an implied
warranty that food sold for human consumption was fit for that pur-
pose and where food was bought from a retailer it was generally
assumed that the seller knew the purpose for which the food was bought
and that the buyer relied on the seller's skill or judgment.2 7 However,
that special warranty did not usually apply where the sale was between
dealers, as in the instant case, although there were cases recognizing
an implied warranty even there.2 8 The Uniform Sales Act no longer
recognizes a special warranty of the fitness of food for human con-
sumption, but where there is knowledge of the purpose by the seller
20 See note 13 supra. I See note 14 supra.
" Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951); McConnell v.
Jones, 228 N. C. 218, 44 S. E. 2d 876 (1947).
"346 Am. JuR., Sales § 346 (1943); 77 C. J. S., Sales § 325 (a) (1952); 1
WILaISTON, SALES § 227 (Rev. ed. 1948).
"46 Am. Jura., Sales §§ 346, 348 (1943) ; 77 C. J. S., Sales §§ 315(b), 325(b)
(1952) ; 1 WILaISTON, SALES §§ 206, 235 (Rev. ed. 1948).
'UNIFORM SALES Acr § 15(1); 77 C. J. S., Sales § 315 (b) (1952); 1
WIL.LISTON, SALES §§ 227, 235, 248 (Rev. ed. 1948).
2" 5 Am. JuR., Auctions § 46 (1936); 7 C. J. S., Auctions and Auctioneers
§ 8c(2) (1937).
'22 Am. JuR., Food § 94 (1939); 77 C. J. S., Sales § 331(a) (1) (1952); 1
WILLISTON, SA.LES § 242 (Rev. ed. 1948).
" 22 Am. JuR., Food § 109 (1939); 77 C. J. S., Sales §§ 330, 331 (a) (1)
(1952); 1 WILISTON, SALES § 242 (Rev. ed. 1948).
"1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242a (Rev. ed. 1948).
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and reliance by the buyer, the same result can be reached under the
provision for an implied warranty for a particular purpose. Where
the sale of food is to the ultimate consumer, the section has been given
a liberal construction so that much the same result has been reached
as under the common law.30 Since in the instant case the sale was not
to the ultimate consumer and the buyer did not rely on the seller's skill
and judgment, there would under the majority rule be no implied war-
ranty that the product was fit for human consumption.
The court in the principal case gives no reason other than precedent
for its decision. Perhaps it is following the policy expressed in Swift
& Co. v. Aydlett in 1926, when the court in advocating an extension of
the doctrine of implied warranty said :31
The harshness of the common-law rule of caveat emptor,
when strictly applied, makes it inconsistent with the principle
upon which modern trade and commerce are conducted; the
doctrine of implied warranty is more in accord with the principle
that "honesty is the best policy," and that both vendor and
vendee, by fair exchange of values, profit by a sale.
Or perhaps it is following expressions in other cases that such a war-
ranty is based on the public policy of preservation of public health or
regard for human life.3 2
The Draughon case raises several interesting questions. By ignoring
earlier cases requiring reliance and applying the doctrine of implied
warranty to a set of facts where there was no reliance, is the court
indicating that reliance is unnecessary? If it is desirable to extend
the doctrine of implied warranties and to protect the public from un-
wholesome food, will the court imply a warranty directly from the
manufacturer to the ultimate consumer?3
The trend in these North Carolina cases seems to point toward a
rule of implied warranty which in effect is more nearly one of absolute
liability on the sellers of food for human consumption, at least as to
the immediate purchaser, whether the sale be to the consumer or to
a dealer, whether or not there be any reliance by the buyer on the
seller's skill or judgment, and whether or not there be any actual
knowledge by the seller of the purpose for which the article is to be
used.
JEANNE OWEN
'o 1 WILLISToN, SALES § 248 (Rev. ed. 1948).
1 192 N. C. 330, 334, 135 S. E. 141, 144 (1926). Repeated in Rabb v. Coving-
ton, 215 N. C. 572, 576, 2 S. E. 2d 705, 708 (1939).
" See notes 18 and 19 Wupra.
" See Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 191 (1952).
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Taxation-Income-Long-Term Compensation-Partnerships
If an individual or a partnership receives' in a tax year at least
80 per cent of the total compensation 2 for personal services3 rendered
over a period of thirty-six months or more,4 § 107 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code may provide relief from the application of a high tax
bracket in that particular year.5 This relief is granted by limiting the
tax on such compensation to the additional tax that would have been
payable if the compensation had been received on a pro rata basis
over the period of service prior to the receipt of the qualifying pay-
ment.0 Thus the taxpayer is allowed the benefit of paying the smaller
1 If the taxpayer is on an accrual basis then an accrual is sufficient. INT. REV.
CODE § 107(a).2 Total compensation is important in determining whether the payment re-
ceived represents 80 per cent thereof. Thus what appears to be a qualifying pay-
ment in a particular year may be reduced below 80 per cent by a subsequent
payment for the same services. Also, there is a problem concerning the separa-
bility of lump-sum payments. For example, in one case the severance pay re-
ceived by an employee after 26 years of service was held to be not separable
from total compensation received over that period and so the 80 per cent test
was not met. Carrigan v. Commissioner, 197 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952). In
another case the additional pay to a corporate officer for services in connection
with a patent controversy between his employer-corporation and another corpora-
tion was held separable from his regular salary. E. A. Terrell, 14 T. C. 572
(1950).
' It has been held that advance payments from a client set apart in a trust
fund do not constitute compensation for personal services until withdrawn,
Hanna v. Commissioner, 156 F. 2d 135 (9th Cir. 1946). In another case it
was held that the proceeds arising from the compromise of a copyright infringe-
ment suit did not constitute compensation for personal services. Jack Rozen-
zweig et al., 1 T. C. 24 (1942).
'The period of thirty-six months or more is measured from the beginning of
services until their termination. The following cases are illustrative of the prob-
lems arising in this area: (a) Was there a thirty-six month period? Lucilla de
V. Whitman, 12 T. C. 324 (1949), aff'd, 178 F. 2d 913 (2d Cir. 1949) (corporate
salary of officer was for services rendered in current year, rather than compensa-
tion for the officer's services during the period in which the corporation was
formed); (b) When did the period begin? James D. Gordon, 10 T. C. 772
(1948), aff'd per curiam, 172 F. 2d 864 (2d Cir. 1949) (the period included
unsuccessful attempts to sell stock by a broker in addition to the time spent
by him on successful negotiations); Guy C. Myers, 11 T. C. 447 (1948) (time
spent in finding a customer may not be included); (c) When did the period
end? Norman R. Williams, 1951 P-H TC MEMO DEc. 1 51,207 (1951) (in the sale
of a corporation the broker's services continued until the last stockholder turned
in his stock).
IINT. REV. CODE § 107(a) provides: "If at least 80 per centum of the total
compensation for personal services covering a period of thirty-six calendar months
or more (from the beginning to the completion of such services) is received or
accrued in one taxable year by an individual or a partnership, the tax attributable
to any part thereof which is included in the gross income of any individual shall
not be greater than the aggregate of the taxes attributable to such Dart had it
been included in the gross income of such individual ratably over that part of
the neriod which precedes the date of such receipt or accrual."
' If the payment of 80 per cent or more is received upon the completion of
services, then the compensation will be spread over the period durinv which the
services were rendered. If the date of payment and the date of the completion
of services are different, then the earlier date is used as the ending date for
the allocation of the lump-sum comnensation for purposes of computing the tax.
Thus, in computing the tax, the allocation period may be less than thirty-six
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of either (1) the tax on the special compensation for the current year
without adjustment or (2) the additional tax on such compensati6n
which would have been payable if the pay had been spread evenly over
the period -during which services were rendered prior to the receipt
of the qualifying payment. The tax for other years is not changed, as
the statute merely provides a formula for computing the income tax
on long-term compensation in the year in which it is received.
This statutory- provision is of special interest to professional per-
sons and partnerships who frequently render services over a long period
of time and who may receive a large payment in one tax year.7 Proper
tax planning is desirable to insure that the requirements of § 107 (a) are
met.8 The problems to be considered here are some which are peculiar
to partnerships. These particular situations arise in connection with
the admission of new partners and the change of the business "entity"
while services are being rendered.
In Van Hook v. United States,9 the taxpayer, an attorney, was re-
quested in 1945 to join in the appeal of a case on which another at-
torney had been working for a period of about four years. The tax-
payer was to share in the contingent fee only in the event that the
outcome was favorable. In 1946 there was a favorable disposition of
the case and the taxpayer claimed the benefit of § 107 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code, even though the services which he performed
covered a period of only about thirteen months. The district court
determined that a joint venture existed and that this relationship quali-
fied as a partnership under § 107 (a).' Then the court held that the
taxpayer was entitled to spread the fee over the entire period during
which the services were rendered. In reversing, the circuit court,
assuming that there was a joint venture, held that the joint venture
did not exist prior to 1945 and, consequently, the taxpayer could not
months where the payment of 80 per cent or more of total compensation is re-
ceived prior to completion of services. U. S. TREAs. REG. 118, § 39.107-1 (1953).
' Thus this section is available to doctors, lawyers, accountants, executors,
architects, consultants, or anyone who may render personal services and meet
the other requirements.
INT. REv. CODE § 107(b) provides for similar treatment of income received
by individuals from artistic works or inventions.
INT. REV. CODE § 107(d) provides somewhat similar treatment for the back
pay received by an individual under specified circumstances.
For 107 (a) problems in general, see 29 A. L. R. 2d 592 (1953) ; Comments,
Current Problems Under 1. R. C. Section 107, 48 N. W. U. L. R. 51 (1953) ;
Bayly, Proper Use of Section 107 Lessens Tax Burden on Lump-Sum Income, 96
J. AcCOUNTANCy 582 (1953) ; Note, Section 107(a) and the Partnership, 65 HARv.
L. REv. 1193 (1952) ; Tannenbaum, Recent Developments Under Section 107, 9
IxsT. FED. TAX. 381 (N. Y. U. 1951).
0204 F. 2d 25 (7th Cir. 1953), reversing 107 F. Supp. 499 (N. D. Ill. 1952),
cert. denied 74 Sup. Ct. 42 (1953).
"INT. REv. CODE § 3797 (a) (2) provides, in part: "The term 'partnership'
includes a ... joint venture . . . by means of which any business, financial opera-
tions, or venture is carried on. .. ."
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tack on the services rendered by his partner in order to meet the thirty-
six month requirement. Furthermore, since there was no evidence
that the compensation received by the taxpayer covered any of the
services rendered prior to the formation of the joint venture, the fee
was considered to cover only current services.
Section 107 was brought into the law by the Revenue Act of 1939
and its provisions then covered compensation received for personal
services rendered "by an individual in his individual capacity, or as
a member of a partnership, and covering a period of five calendar years
or more from the beginning to the completion of such services .... 011
Under this statute it was held that a taxpayer could not tack on the
individual services of his new partner rendered prior to the formation
of the partnership.1 2  Under the prior law, the statutory language
seemed to make it plain that a partner must actually participate in the
services throughout the required time.
An amendment in 1942 changed § 107 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code to its present form. 13 One of the changes liberalized the require-
ments so that a partner who shares in long-term compensation may be
entitled to the benefits of the section, even though he performed none
of the services. 14
If a partner is a member of the partnership during the time in
which the services are rendered, he is entitled to the benefits of § 107 (a),
providing the other requirements are met, regardless of whether or not
he participates in the work.15 In Elder W. Marshall,1 where a new
"Revenue Act of 1939, § 220, 53 STAT. 878 (1939).
"Ralph G. Lindstrom, 3 T. C. 686 (1944), aff'd, 149 F. 2d 344 (9th Cir. 1945).
13 Revenue Act of 1942, § 139, 56 STAr. 837 (1942).
"The Congressional intent was stated in the following language: "In order
for section 107(a) to be applicable, it is not necessary that the individual who
includes in his gross income compensation for such personal services be the person
who rendered such services. For example, a partner who shares in compensation
for such personal services rendered by the partnership may be entitled to the
benefits of section 107(a), notwithstanding that he took no part in the rendering
of such services. Likewise, in community property states, the spouse of a person
who renders such personal services may be entitled to the benefits of section
107(a)." SEN. RzP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 109 (1942).
"
5 Although the partner does not perform any of the particular services he
is a part of the partnership for the required time and his share of partnership
income represents a return from all partnership services.
10 14 T. C. 90 (1950), aff'd per curiarn, 185 F. 2d 674 (3d Cir. 1950) ; accord,Burnham Enersen, 1950 P-H MEMO. DEc. f 50,024 (1950), aff'd per curriam,
187 F. 2d 233 (9th Cir. 1951; Sigvald Nielsen, 1950 P-H MEMO. DEC. 50,025(1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F. 2d 233 (9th Cir. 1951). In each of these cases
the new partner was an employee of the firm before being made a partner. InBurnham Enersen, .rpra, the partner, as an employee, participated in the services
from the beginning. However, this factor does not seem to be an important
element in the courts decision.
In Elder W. Marshall, supra, the court noted that the admission of a newpartner did not bring about a dissolution of the old firm or create a new one,
so that it could not be argued that the services were not rendered by the samepartnership. The opinion cited Callahan v. War Contracts Price Adjustment
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partner was admitted to the firm less than thirty-six months prior to
the receipt of the qualifying fees, the court held that he could avail
himself of the benefits of the statute and spread his share of the fees
back to the beginning of the services. The court held that it is "the
status of the recipient of the income in the year of receipt and not
either his status in prior years .. .or the identity of the individual
who contributed the services that is made to govern the application of
section 107. .... -17
However, in a later case law partners were not allowed to spread
back their share of long-term compensation where a different partner-
ship had rendered the services.' 8 The taxpayers were special partners
in a law firm which had performed services for an estate.' The firm
was dissolved due to the bankruptcy of one of the partners and a second
partnership was formed by the same parties. The taxpayers' status
remained the same as special partners with no interest in the assets.
The second partnership was dissolved because of the death of a partner.
A third firm was organized in which the taxpayers were general part-
ners owning a percentage interest in the assets, and this firm pur-
chased the claim against the estate from the first firm at public auction.
Upon the collection of the claim the taxpayers claimed that their share
represented payment for services rendered by them as members of the
first firm. The court held that the controlling factor was that the
partnership receiving the income was not the partnership which per-
formed the services and, therefore, § 107 (a) was not applicable. The
court stated that the amendment in 1942 "did not dispense with the
requirement that the partnership through which the taxpayer received
his income, must have performed the services for which the income is
paid."' 9
The decision in the Van Hook20 case appears to be sound. The
court's main consideration was the purpose for which § 107 was enacted
and that was to provide relief from the hardship resulting from the
receipt of long-term compensation in one year and subjecting it to tax
at higher surtax brackets. 21  The court noted that the 1942 amend-
Board, 13 T. C. 355 (1949) and the Uniform Partnership Act §§ 29, 31.
But see dissenting opinion, 14 T. C. at 95 (1950). Three judges in the Tax
Court (Hill, Leech and Arnold) dissented on the following grounds: (1) A new
partnership is formed when a new partner is admitted. The Uniform Partnership
Act does not change the common law rule that the old partnership is ended. (2)
The compensation received by the new partner was to cover only services since
admission.
xL 14 T. C. at 94, 95 (1950). § 107(a) has been applied to income earned by
a husband but attributable to his wife in a joint return filed under the income
splitting provisions. Hofferbert v. Marshall, 200 F. 2d 648 (4th Cir. 1952).
18 Sovik v. Shaughnessy, 191 F. 2d 895 (2d Cir. 1951).
191 F. 2d at 896 (2d Cir. 1951). 20 See note 9 supra.
21204 F. 2d at 27 (7th Cir. 1953). The court cited SEN. REP. No. 648, 76
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7.
14
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ment eliminated the requirement that the recipient of the compensation
be the one who performs the services, but the court emphasized that
"there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress
abandoned the 'burden' theory which was the motive for enacting the
original legislation. '22  In this case it is obvious that the compensa-
tion received by the taxpayer was for the services he had rendered and
those services covered only a thirteen month period.
It is submitted that this "burden" test represents a desirable approach
to the problem of the new partner in § 107 (a) situations. It seems
that the MarshalPl rationale is an unwarranted extension of the purpose
behind the statute, even though the situation came under the literal lan-
guage of the section, because the compensation received by the new
partner was for current services although it was measured, in part, by
long-term compensation. Perhaps the Marshall line of cases may be justi-
fied by the fact that in each of these cases the new partner was a former
employee. However, under the "burden" test this should not be sig-
nificant because the employee is paid for his services. Nevertheless, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue has announced that it would follow these
cases.24
The Van Hook decision appears to be a justifiable limitation on the
scope of § 107 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
PAUL M. CARRUTHERS
Torts-Malicious Prosecution-Public Officers
It would seem that all persons capable' of instituting, or causing
to be instituted, a malicious prosecution2 without probable cause should
" 204 F. 2d at 27 (7th Cir. 1953). 2" See note 16 supra.
" In G. C. M. 26993, 1951 INT. REv. BULL. No. 22 at 2, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue announced that it would follow the Marshall line of cases (see note
16 supra), and noted that in each of these cases there was a proper business
motive. It stated that a partner would be entitled to allocate his share of long-
term compensation over the entire period "notwithstanding the fact that part of
the services" were rendered prior to the admission of the partner.
One author has suggested the possibility that the Bureau may oppose alloca-
tion where all of the work was done prior to the admission of the new partner,
because of the wording of G. C. M. 26993, supra, quoted above. For this point
and for a discussion of several partnership questions that have not been considered
by the courts see note, 65 Hauv. L. Rrv. 1193, 1197 (1952).
'It is held in some instances that a mentally incompetent person, or an infant,
is not capable of instituting a malicious prosecution. 34 Am. JuR., Malicious Pros-
ecution § 84 (1941).
'In order to establish an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must
prove (1) that the defendant instituted or procured the institution of the criminal
prosecution against him; (2) that it was with malice; (3) that the prosecution
was without probable cause; and (4) that it was terminated in favor of the plain-
tiff in the action. Alexander v. Lindsey, 230 N. C. 663, 55 S. E. 2d 470 (1949).
No action will lie for the prosecution of a civil action with malice and without
probable cause, where there has been no arrest of the person or seizure of his
property. Jerome v. Shaw, 172 N. C. 862, 90 S. E. 764 (1916). Generally, see
34 Am. JuR., Malicious Prosecutio n §§ 1-171 (1941).
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respond in damageg for their unlawful and malicious act, and it is
generally so held.3 However, for reasons of public policy, this geneial
principle has been limited in case of public officers.4 If it is assumed
that a plaintiff has grounds for a malicious prosecution action, the out-
come of his action against a public officer,5 who acted with malice and
without probable cause,6 will vary with the jurisdiction and the im-
munity given the particular officer.
The judiciary was the first group of public officers to be granted
immunity for malicious acts. It is well established today that a judicial
officer acting judicially and within his jurisdiction is not liable in an
action for malicious prosecution, even though he may have acted
maliciously and without probable cause.7 This may seem to be a wrong
without a remedy, but the rationalization for adhering to the proposi-
'Rieger v. Knight, 128 Md. 189, 97 Atf. 358 (1916); Mfgr.'s and Jobber's
Finance Corp. v. Lane, 221 N. C. 189, 19 S. E. 2d 849 (1942) ; Kolka v. Jones,
6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 558 (1897) ; 34 Am. JUR., Malicious Prosecution § 8 (1941).
'Anno., 28 A. L. R. 2d 646 (1951).
"A public office is an agency for the State, and the person whose duty it is
to perform this agency is a public officer. This we consider to be the true defi-
nition of a public officer in its original broad sense. The essence of it is the
duty of performing an agency, that is, of doing some act or series of acts for
the State .. . To illustrate our definition: The Executive Department is an agency
for the State, and the Governor and others, whose duty it is to discharge this
agency, are public officers. The Judicial Department is an agency for the State,
and the Judges are public officers. The Legislative Department is an agency of
the State and the members of the Senate and House of Representatives are public
officers." Clark v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 60, 63 (1871); 67 C. J. S., Officers § 2(b)(1950).
'In Ellis v. Hampton, 123 N. C. 194,195, 31 S. E. 473,474 (1898), the courthad this to say about malice relative to malicious prosecution: "In Brooks v.
Jones, 33 N. C., 260, it was held that in actions of malicious prosecution the
plaintiff must show particular malice as contra distinguished from general malice,
a disposition to do wrong-malice against mankind-on the part of the defendant
towards him. The court said in that case: 'This particular malice may be proved
by positive testimony of threats or expressions of ill will used by the defendant
in reference to the plaintiff, or it may be inferred from the want of probable
cause and other circumstances.' However, in Thomas v. Norris, 64 N. C., 780,
apparently a different rule is laid down. There evidence of malice on the part
of the defendant against another person, who was arrested under same warrant
with the plaintiff, was received as evidence of malice toward the plaintiff also."
Generally, see 34 Am. JUR., Malicious Prosecution § 135 (1941).
Ravenscroft v. Casey, 139 F. 2d 776 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
745, rehearing denied, 323 U. S. 814 (1944) (police judge and county judge held
immune); Burgin v. Sullivan, 151 Ala. 416, 44 So. 202 (1907) (mayor acting
as magistrate held immune) ; Prentice v. Bertken, 50 Cal. App. 2d 344, 123 P. 2d
96 (1942) (justice of peace) ; Curnow v. Kessler, 110 Mich. 10, 67 N. W. 982(1896) (justice of peace); Hoppe v. Klopperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N. W. 2d
780 (1947) (municipal judge); Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 295 N. W. 299(1940) (commr. in bankruptcy proceeding)'; Grant v. Williams, 54 Mont. 246,
169 Pac. 286 (1917) (justice of peace); Scott v. Fishblate, 117 N. C. 265, 24
S. E. 436 (1895) (mayor acting as magistrate) ; Furr v. Moss, 52 N. C. 525 (1860)(justice of peace); Cunningham v. Dillard, 20 N. C. 485 (1839) (justice of
peace) ; Shaw v. Moon, 117 Or. 558, 245 Pac. 318 (1926) (recorder judge) ; 34
Am. JuR., Malicious Prosecution § 87 (1941). Contra: Hagerman v. Sutherland,
16 Ky. L. R. 301, 27 S. W. 982 (1894) (justice of peace); Vennum v. Huston, 38
Neb. 293, 56 N. W. 970 (1893) (justice of peace).
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tion is stated in a North Carolina case, Scott v. Fishblate,8 where it is
said:
But if this is so (that there is a wrong without a remedy), it is
necessarily so; and it must be taken that the plaintiff has agreed
that it shall be so.
But for the government of which he is a part, there would be
no law, nor would there be any courts to right public wrongs,
none to which the citizen (the plaintiff) could appeal to have his
private rights declared and enforced. But for the law and the
courts to declare and enforce the law, the plaintiff would be with-
out remedy for any grievance, and the law of course might pre-
vail. To have this legal protection, it is necessary to have courts,
judges, justices of the peace, including mayors of towns and cities.
And it is the experience and wisdom of our country that those
courts cannot exist, or at least cannot 'discharge their judicial
functions, unless they are made free from pecuniary liability for
their judgments while so acting. This does not protect them
from impeachment, nor from indictment for misconduct, fraud
or corruption in office, because these are public wrongs com-
mitted against the government whose servants they are.
Nevertheless, some North Carolina cases contain language which might
lead one to believe that the law in North Carolina is otherwise than as
stated above. In State v. Swanson,9 where a sheriff was being sued
for malicious prosecution, the court used the following language:
The law applicable to the facts alleged in the complaint, as enun-
ciated by the opinions of this court, is that public officers acting
in a judicial capacity or quasi-judicial capacity are exempt from
civil liability and cannot be called upon to respond in damages
to private individuals for the honest exercise of his judgment
though his judgment may have been erroneous; however, in
cases where a public officer, even judicial or quasi-judicial, in-
stead of acting in an honest exercise of his judgment, acts cor-
ruptly or of malice, such officer is liable in a suit instituted against
him by an individual who has suffered special damage by reason
of such corrupt or malicious action.
But in the above quoted case, and in other North Carolina cases which
contain statements that a judicial officer is not completely immune
for malicious acts, it appears that the public officer involved was not
- '117 N. C. 265, 275, 23 S. E. 436 (1895) (contempt order of mayor acting injudicial capacity could not be questioned by plaintiff even though the mayor acted
erroneously and with malice).
0 223 N. C. 442, 444, 27 S. E. 2d 122, 123 (1943).
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a judge acting in his judicial capacity, but was an administrative or
executive officer with discretionary or ministerial powers. 10 Thus, it
would seem that the Scott v. Fishblate decision, which granted im-
munity to judges, justices of the peace, and mayors acting in a judicial
capacity for malicious judicial acts within their jurisdiction, is not
affected by State v. Swanson, or similar decisions.
Relative to the judiciary, the majority rule is that grand jurors may
not be held-liable in an action for malicious prosecution for acts per-
formed in the discharge of their official duties, however malicious or
destitute of probable cause their action may have been.'1
As a result of the growth of administrative and executive govern-
mental activities, many duties formerly considered to be completely
ministerial in function have taken on the semblance of judicial charac-
ter, and quasi-judicial officials12 whose functions require the exercise
of discretion in the administration of their 'duties have been given im-
munity in many jurisdictions. 13  The immunity given to administrative
and executive officers exercising judgment and discretion has not been
as complete as that given to judges. Prosecuting attorneys have been
held immune to civil liability for their malicious actions in the per-
forriance of their duties by the majority of the jurisdictions deciding
"0 Smith v. Hefner, 235 N. C. 1, 68 S. E. 2d 783 (1951) (school trustees and
park commissioners) ; State v. Swanson, 223 N. C. 442, 27 S. E. 2d 122 (1943)
(sheriff); Wilkinson v. Burton and Ward v. Burton, 220 N. C. 13, 16 S. E. 2d
406 (1941) (division engineer of state highway) ; Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N. C.
241, 13 S. E. 2d 423 (1941) (mayor and aldermen); Gurganious v. Simpson, 213
N. C. 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938). (coroner not acting in judicial capacity)
Spruill v. Davenport, 178 N. C. 364, 100 S. E. 527 (1919) (school committee);
Hipp v. Ferrall, 173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917) (highway commission);
Templeton v. Beard, 159 N. C. 63, 74 S. E. 735 (1912) (county commissioners).
" Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), affg., 8 F. 2d 161 (S. D. N. Y.
1925), cert. granted, 273 U. S. 677, and affd., 275 U. S. 503 (1926); White v.
Towers, 27 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P. 2d 209 (1951); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind.
117, 44 N. E. 1001 (1896) ; 38 C. J. S., Grand Juries § 45 (1943).
"2 The difference between judicial and quaii-judicial officers is explained in 34
C. J., Judicial § 5 (1924) as follows: "The term 'judicial' may be applied to the
act of an officer who, in the exercise of his functions, is required to pass upon
facts and to determine his action by the facts found; this is sometimes called a
'quasi-judicial function.' Quasi-judicial is a term used to describe acts presumed
to be the product of judgment based upon evidence, either oral or visual, or both.
There is a distinction between acts that are quasi-judicial and those that are
purely judicial. Where a power vests in a judgment or discretion, so that it
is of judicial nature, but does not involve the exercise of the functions of a judge
or is conferred upon an officer having no authority of a judicial character the
expression used is generally 'quasi-judicial.'"
" Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'g., 8 F. 2d 161 (S. D. N. Y.
1925), cert. granted, 273 U. S. 677, and aff'd., 275 U. S. 503 (1926) (ass't. to
U. S. Atty. Gen.) ; Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 44 P. 2d 592 (1935) (city
prosecutor) ; Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N. E. 1001 (1896) (prosecuting
attorney) ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 Pac. 663 (1917) (city attorney) ;
Copeland v. Donovan, 124 Misc. 553, 208 N. Y. Supp. 765 (County Ct. 1925)(prosecuting attorney) ; Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N. D. 227, 216 N. W. 898 (1927)
(state's attorney); Anderson v. Manley, 181 Wash. 327, 43 P. 2d 39 (1935)
(prosecuting attorney); RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 656(d) (1938). Contra: Moye
v. McLawhorn, 208 N. C. 812, 182 S. E. 493 (1935).
1954]
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the question.1 4  Some other administrative and executive officers who
have been given immunity though they acted maliciously in the per-
formance of their duties are as follows: postmaster general,' 5 comp-
troller of currency,16 secretary of treasury, 7 parole board,18 mayor,19
board of health,20 superintendent of schools,2 1 and town commission-
ers.22 Although the tendency today seems to be toward extending
immunity for malicious prosecution to public administrative and execu-
tive officers exercising judgment and discretion in the performance of
their duties, North Carolina has not extended such immunity to these
officials. In a tort action against county commissioners, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held in Moye v. McLawhorn23 that the com-
missioners could not be held liable as public officers with discretionary
duties in the absence of an allegation of malice or corruption. (Italics
supplied.) The rule is stated in Hipp v. Ferral124 as follows:
It is held in this State that public officers in the performance of
their official and governmental duties, involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, may not be held liable as individuals
for breach of such duty unless they act corruptly and of malice.
Law enforcement officers, i.e., police,25 constables, 26 sheriffs,2 7 fish
and game investigators, 28 and building inspectors,20 have had immunity
" Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App. D. C. 100, 99 F. 2d 135 (1938), cert. denied,
305 U. S. 643, rehearings denied, 305 U. S. 673 and 307 U. S. 651 (1938) ; 34
Am. Jun, Malicious Prosecution § 88 (1941); RESTATEMENT, ToR's § 656(d)
(1938) ; see Note 13, supra.
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896).
Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App. D. C. 100, 99 F. 2d 135 (1938), cert. denied,
305 U. S. 643, rehearings denied, 305 U. S. 673 and 307 U. S. 651 (1938).
' Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 63 App. D. C. 339, 72 F. 2d 557
(1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 605 (1934).
"
8 Lang v. Wood, 67 App. D. C. 287, 92 F. 2d 211 (1937), cert. denied, 302
U. S. 686 (1937).9 Burgin v. Sullivan, 151 Ala. 416, 44 So. 202 (1907).
"0 Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883).
SJohnnv. Moser, 181 Okla. 75, 72 P. 2d 715 (1937).
B2 frown v. Wimpenny, 239 Mass. 278, 132 N. E. 43 (1921).
23208 N. C. 812, 182 S. E. 493 (1935).
24173 N. C. 167, 169, 91 S. E. 831, 832 (1917).
"Laughi 23v. Garnett, 78 App. D. C. 194, 138 F. 2d 931 (1943), cert. denied,
322 U. S. 738 (1943); White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P. 2d 209 (1951);
Anno., 28 A. L. R. 2d 646 (1951). Contra: Brown v. Winpenny, 239 Mass. 278,
132 N. E. 43 (1921); Motley v. Dugan, 191 S. W. 2d 979 (Mo. App. 1945);
Hawkins v. Reynolds, 236 N. C. 422, 72 S. E. 2d 874 (1952); Alexander v. Lind-
sey, 230 N. C. 662 55 S. E. 2d 470 (1949); Perry v. Hurdle, 229 N. C. 216,
49 S. E. 2d 400 (1948); Atkinson v. Birmingham, 44 R. 1. 123, 116 At. 205(1922); Kidd v. Reynolds, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 355, 50 S. W. 600 (1899).
28 White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P. 2d 209 (1951). Contra: Kidd v.
Reynolds, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 355, 50 S. W. 600 (1899).2
'Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P. 2d 876, cert. denied, 344 U. S.
840 (1952). Contra: Moser v. Fulk, 237 N. C. 302, 74 S. E. 2d 729 (1953);
Alexander V. Lindsey, 230 N. C. 662, 55 S. E. 2d 470 (1949).
2' White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P. 2d 209 (1951).
"9 Springfield v. Carter, 175 F. 2d 914 (8th Cir. 1949); White v. Brinkiman,
23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P. 2d 254 (1937).
[Vol. 32
NOTES AND COMMENT
extended to them in a few jurisdictions even though they may have
acted maliciously and without probable cause. Fewer jurisdictions
have been willing to go this far in granting immunity than in the other
two categories mentioned, i.e., judiciary and administrative and execu-
tive officers. The reason for so extending immunity has been predi-
cated on the ground that public policy requires that law enforcement
officers be exempted from civil liability for acts within the scope of
their authority so that they may fearlessly administer their duties.3°
That North Carolina does not extend immunity to law enforcement
officers relative to an action for malicious prosecution is exemplified
by the Court's statement in Perry v. Hurdle,31 an action against two
police officers for malicious prosecution:
The existence of circumstances and facts strong enough to excite
in a reasonable mind the well-founded belief that the person
charged is guilty would be sufficient to protect a police officer
who acts in good faith, though it be subsequently shown that the
person arrested and prosecuted was not guilty of the offense.
In the jurisdictions which grant immunity to law enforcement officers,
it is extended only if the officer acts within the scope of his authority. 2
Even where such immunity is not extended to law enforcement officers,
it has been held that if the officer does no more than is required of him
in the execution of a legal process, fair on its face, this constitutes a
defense to any action for malicious prosecution based on such process.
3
However, the decision would be affected by the fact of whether the of-
ficer swore out the warrant in the first place. Advice of counsel before
instituting an action is a defense in the majority of states,34 but in
North Carolina it is only evidence bearing on the issue of malice and
probable cause.3 5 North Carolina is in accord with the jurisdictions
-o Anno., 28 A. L. R. 2d 646 (1951).3a 229 N. C. 216, 220, 49 S. E. 2d 400, 402 (1948).
32 Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App. D. C. 100, 99 F. 2d 135 (1938), cert. denied,
305 U. S. 643, rehearings denied, 305 U. S. 673 and 307 U. S. 651 (1938) ; Spring-
field v. Carter, 175 F. 2d 914 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d
315, 239 P. 2d 876, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 840 (1952).3' Hoppe v. Klopperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N. W. 2d 780 (1947) ; Alexander v.
Lindsey, 230 N. C. 663, 55 S. E. 2d 470 (1949) ; Kidd v. Reynolds, 20 Tex. Civ.
App. 355, 50 S. E. 600 (1899).
"' 34 Am. Jun., Malicious Prosecution § 71 (1941).
" Bryant v. Murray, 239 N. C. 18, 79 S. E. 2d 243 (1953) ; Downing v. Stone,
152 N. C. 525, 530, 68 S. E. 9, 11 (1910) wherein it is said: "The decisions of this
state have uniformly held that advice of counsel, however learned, on a statement
of facts, however full, does not of itself and as a matter of law afford protection
to one who has instituted an unsuccessful prosecution against another; but such
advice is only evidence to be submitted to the jury on the issue of malice... And
where it is proven that legal advice was taken by a prosecutor, this too is a rele-
vant circumstance in connection with other facts, admitted or established, to be
considered by the court in determining the question of probable cause . . . This
restriction as to advice of counsel learned in the law on facts fully and fairly
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which hold that a prosecution under a void warrant will not support
an action for malicious prosecution in that no offense has been legally
charged. 6 There is a conflict of authority on this point however.8 7 If
the law enforcement officer, or other public officer, escapes an action
for malicious prosecution, he may still be liable for the tort of false
arrest 8 or abuse of process3" in the jurisdictions where he is not given
immunity for malicious acts in the performance of his duties.
There seems to be a growing tendency to extend immunity for ma-
licious prosecution to administrative, executive, and law enforcement
officers, but it is submitted that North Carolina's position is more fair to
the citizen in refusing to extend such immunity beyond judicial officers
acting in a judicial capacity. It is conceded that governmental adminis-
trative, executive, and police officers should not be unduly hampered
in the exercise of their duties, but it is of paramount importance that
the individual citizen be granted some protection and be compensated
for injury to him without right and with malice.
ELTON C. PRMGEN
Torts-Negligence-Availability of Defense of Assumption of Risk
In an action brought by the administrator of a guest passenger in
defendant's automobile to recover damages for the wrongful death of
plaintiff's intestate, the North Carolina Supreme Court recently said,
"Assumption of risk was not available as a defense for there was no
stated does not seem to be in accord with the weight of authority as it obtains
in other jurisdictions .... but it has been too long accepted and acted on here
to be now questioned, and we are of opinion, too, that ours is the safer position."
" Satilla Mfg. Co. v. Cason, 98 Ga. 14, 25 S. E. 909 (1895) ; Moser v. Fulk,
237 N. C. 302, 74 S. E. 2d 729 (1953) ; Wadkins v. Digman, 82 W. Va. 623, 96
S. E. 1016 (1918). Contra: Calhoun v. Bell, 136 La. 149, 66 So. 761 (1914);
Williams v. Vanmeter, 8 Mo. 339 (1844).
134 Am. Ju1-, Malicious Prosecution § 21 (1941).
"' "The second question of law involves the distinction between actions for
false arrest or imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Corpus Juris, Vol. 25,
p. 444, draws the distinction as follows: 'Put briefly, the essential difference
between a wrongful detention for which malicious prosecution will lie, and one
for which false imprisonment will lie, is that in the former the detention is
malicious but under due forms of law, whereas in the latter the detention is
without color of legal authority.' The Court adopted the same view of the law
in Rhodes v. Collins, 198 N. C. 23, 150 S. E. 492. Clarkson, J., said: 'False im-
prisonment is based upon the deprivation of one's liberty without legal process,
while malicious prosecution is for a prosecution founded upon legal process, but
maintained maliciously and without probable cause.'" Young v. Hardwood Co.,
200 N. C. 310, 311, 156 S. E. 501, 502 (1931).
9 "The tort of abuse of process is sometimes confused with malicious prosecu-
tion. In both, an injury is caused by the wrongful employment of legal process,
but the two are definitely distinguishable. In malicious prosecution the gist of
the injury is commencing an action or causing process to issue as an incident
thereto, without justification. Malice, want of probable cause, and a termination
of the proceeding adverse to the party who commenced it must be shown. On
the other hand, an action for abuse of process lies not because the defendant has
set process in motion but because he has misapplied or perverted it for a wrong-
ful end after it has been issued." Note, 16 N. C. L. REv. 277, 278 (1938).
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contractual relation between plaintiff's intestate and the defendants."'
The term "assumption of risk" is often confusing, as it is used by
courts in different senses and in various situations. Assumption of
risk .means that the plaintiff has "consented to relieve the defendant
of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chance of injury
from a known risk."2 The basis of the defense is consent as expressed
by mental willingness and not necessarily through a contractual rela-
tionship between the parties.3  Although there is some authority to be
found for confining the doctrine to cases arising out of the relation of
master and servant,4 or cases involving a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties, 5 the general trend seems to be toward the
availability of the doctrine as a defense in situations where neither
contractual relationship nor the relationship of master and servant
exists,6 under the general principle expressed in the maxim volenti non
1 Goode v. Barton, 238 N. C. 492, 496, 78 S. E. 2d 398, 402 (1953). This
note does not attempt to discuss the adequacy of the defense of assumption of
risk, but is limited in its scope to a brief discussion of the availability of the
doctrine as a defense in certain areas of the law.
2Mountain v. Wheatley, Foss v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031
(1951); Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836 (1943) ; Bull S. S.
Line v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 77 A. 2d 142 (1950) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt.
429, 35 A. 2d 439 (1944); Emerick v. Mayr, 39 Wash. 2d 23, 234 P. 2d 1079
(1951) ; PRossit, ToRTs § 51, p. 377 (1941).
Edwards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875 (1939) ; Bull S. S. Line v.
Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 77 A. 2d 142 (1950) ; Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12
N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ; Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946) ;
Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S. E. 57 (1937); Switzer v.
Weiner, 230 Wis. 599, 284 N. W. 509 (1939) ; 4 BLASrFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AuTo-
MOBILE LAW § 2511 (1946) ; PRoSSER, ToRTs § 51 (1941) ; Note, 26 TEMPLE L. Q.
206 (1952).
'Conrad v. Springfield Consol. R. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N. E. 180 (1909) (but
cf. Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E- 2d 879 [1938]) ;
Modlin v. Consumers Cooperative Ass'n., 172 Kan. 428, 241 P. 2d 692 (1952);
Parker v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 261 Mich. 293, 246 N. W. 125 (1933);
Peyla v. Duluth M. & I. R. R. Co., 218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W. 2d 518 (1944);
Biskup v. Hoffman, 220 Mo. App. 542, 287 S. W. 865 (1926); Papakalos v.
Shaka, 91 N. H. 265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941); Dowse v. Maine Cent. R. R., 91
N. H. 419, 20 A. 2d 629 (1941); Rutherford v. James, 33 N. M. 440, 270 Pac.
794 (1928); Eddy v. Wells, 59 N. D. 663, 231 N. W. 785 (1930); Eldred v.
United Amusement Co. et al., 137 Ore. 452, 2 P. 2d 1114 (1931); Furbeck v. I.
Gevurtzo & Son et al., 72 Ore. 12, 143 Pac. 654 (1914).
'Edwards v. Southern Ry. Co., 233 Ala. 65, 169 So. 715 (1936); McGeever v.
O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508 (1919) ; Reed v. Zellers, 273 Ill. App. 18 (1933) ;
Walsh v. Moore, 244 11. App. 458 (1927); Pittsburgh C. C. & Sd. Ry. Co. v.
Hoffman. 57 Ind. App. 431, 107 N. E. 315 (1914); Goode v. Barton, 238 N. C.
492, 78 S. E. 2d 398 (1953); Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S. W. 2d 607
(1952).
'Paul v. U. S., 54 F. Supp. 60 (E. D. La. 1943); Mountain v. Wheatley,
Foss v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031 (1951) ; Hedding v. Pearson
et al., 76 Cal. App. 2d 481, 173 P. 2d 382 (1946); Doberrentz v. Gregory, 129
Conn. 57, 26 A. 2d 475 (1942) ; Jackson v. McMillan et al., 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.
2d 773 (1943); Campion v. Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E. 2d 879(1938); Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N. W. 2d 79 (1952) ; McLeod
Stores v. Vinson, 213 Ky. 667, 281 S. W. 799 (1926): Brown v. Waller, 8 So. 2d
304 (La. Ct. App., 2d Cir., 1942) ; Miher v. Conn. River R. R. Co., 153 Mass.
398, 26 N. E. 994 (1891) ; Landru v. Stensrud et al., 219 Minn. 227, 17 N. W.
19541
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fit injuria-a principle broad enough to cover all cases where an injury
results to plaintiff from a risk knowingly and willingly incurred.
7
The doctrine had its earliest and most frequent application in master
and servant cases.8 The 1939 amendment to the Federal Employer's
Liability Act abolished assumption of risk as a defense in actions brought
under that statute, as did the various state Workmen's Compensation
Acts.9 These statutory bars to its availability as a defense have prob-
ably been responsible for the decline of its use in the courts.
In the last two decades, however, considerable litigation has arisen
from injuries to spectators at athletic contests and other places of
amusement. In jurisdictions allowing the doctrine, in its broader
aspect, to be used as a 'defense, the courts have held that assumption
of risk is available in these actions.' 0 In these cases, proprietors of
2d 322 (1945) (although Minn. court in Peyla v. Duluth, 218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W.
2d 518 [1944], had said that in other than master and servant cases, assumption
of risk is but a phase of contributory negligence, the earlier case was not re-
ferred to in this opinion) ; Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947) ;
Lake v. Enigh, 118 Mont. 325, 167 P. 2d 575 (1946); Landrum v. Roddy, 143
Neb. 934, 12 N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ; Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian Church
et al., 123 N. J. L. 325, 8 A. 2d 567" (1939); McLean v. Studebaker Bros. Co. of
N. Y., 221 N. Y. 475, 117 N. E. 951 (1917); Fay v. Thasher, 77 Ohio App. 179,
66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946); Gargaro v. Kroger Groc. & Baking Co., 22 Tenn. App.
70, 118 S. W. 2d 561 (1938); Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S. W.
2d 828 (1938) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A. 2d 439 (1944) ; Tiller v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 190 Va. 605, 58 S. E. 2d 45 (1950); Emerick v. Mayr,
39 Wash. 2d 23, 234 P. 2d 1079 (1951); Wright v. Valan, 130 W. Va. 466, 43
S. E. 2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S. E.
57 (1937) ; Johnsen v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367, 55 N. W. 2d 394 (1952) ; 4 BLASH-
FIELD, CYcLoPEDIA OF AuTomoBIns LAW § 2511 (1946); PROSSER, TORTS § 51
(1941) ; Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REv. 14 (1906) ; 38
Am. JUR., Assumption of Risk § 171 (1941).7 Hedding v. Pearson et aL., 76 Cal. App. 2d 481, 173 P. 2d 382 (1946); Ed-
wards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875 (1939) ; McLeod Stores v. Vinson,
213 Ky. 667, 281 S. W. 799 (1926); Miner v. Conn. River R. Co. 153 Mass. 398,
26 N. E. 994 (1891) ; Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ;
Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946) ; Gargaro v. Kroger
Groc. & Baking Co., 22 Term, App. 70, 118 S. W. 2d 561 (1938); Bouchard v.
Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A. 2d 439 (1944) ; Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, Inc.,
31 Wash. 2d 396, 197 P. 2d 233 (1948) ; Wright v. Valan, 130 W. Va. 466, 43 S. E.
2d 364 (1947) ; 1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE § 135 (Rev. ed. 1941).
' PROSSE, TORTS § 51 (1941).
9 45 U. S. C. A. § 54 (1943) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-14, 15, 16 (1950).
"0 Uline Ice, Inc. v. Sullivan et al., 187 F. 2d 82 (D. C. Cir. 1950) ; Thurman
et aL, v. Ice Palace et al., 36 Cal. App. 364, 97 P. 2d 999 (1939) (ice hockey) ;
Quinn et al., v. Recreation Park Ass'n et aL, 3 Cal. 2d 725, 46 P. 2d 144 (1935)
(baseball); Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E. 2d
879 (1938); Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168,
5 N. E. 2d 1 (1936) (ice hockey) ; Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29
N. W. 2d 453 (1947) (ice hockey); Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Ath. Ass'n.,
122 Minn. 327, 142 N. W. 2d 706 (1913) (baseball) (cf. Peyla v. Duluth, M. & I.
R. R. Co., 218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W. 2d 518 [1944]); Page v. Unterreiner, 106
S. W. 2d 528 (Mo. App. 1937) (golf; this case does not refer to Biskup v. Hoff-
man, 220 Mo. App. 542, 287 S. W. 865 [1926], wherein the court held that the
doctrine of assumption of risk was not applicable in absence of relationship of
master and servant, nor to Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168
Mo. App. 301, 153 S. W. 1076 [1913] wherein it was held that plaintiff, injured
by foul ball at a baseball game, was precluded from recovery by his own con-
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premises in which athletic events are held are required to use ordinary
and reasonable care for the protection and safety of patrons, and the
doctrine is applied if plaintiff is known to have an appreciation and
knowledge of the hazard.:" In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
"The timorous may stay at home.'
12
Another area in which the doctrine is finding greater application
concerns automobile guest cases. Of course, in jurisdictions where the
rule is applied only in its limited form the defense is not available in
these cases.' 3 But where the doctrine prevails in the more general
and extensive aspect, the defendant may avail himself of the defense
of assumption of risk as a bar to plaintiff's recovery.14 In jurisdictions
allowing the assumption of risk as a defense, and having a guest statute
limiting liability to cases of the driver's gross negligence or wanton
misconduct, the doctrine has been applied with effectiveness.' 5 The
elements of assumption of risk by a guest are (1) a hazard or danger
inconsistent with the safety of the guest, (2) knowledge and apprecia-
tributory negligence "if it cannot be said that he assumed the risk"'); Tite v.
Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N. W. 2d 90 (1943) (ice hockey); Inger-
soll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y. S. 505 (3d Dep't
1935) (ice hockey); Povanda v. Powers, 152 Misc. 75, 272 N. Y. S. 619 (Sup. Ct.
N. Y. Cty. 1934) (golf); Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N. Y.
479, 166 N. E. 173 (1929) (amusement park ride called "The Flopper"); Ben-
jamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 Atl. 10 (1931); Douglas et al. v.
Converse, 248 Pa. 232, 93 AtI. 955 (1915) (polo) ; James v. Rhode Island Audi-
torium, 60 R. I. 405, 199 Atl. 293 (1938) (ice hockey); Keep v. Alamo City
Baseball Co., 150 S. W. 2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (cf. Schiller v. Rice, 151
Tex. 116, 246 S. W. 2d 607 [19521); Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105
Wash. 215, 181 Pac. 679 (1919) (baseball).
11 See cases cited note 10 supra; Note, 26 TEMPLE L. Q. 206 (1952) (pointing
out distinction drawn by some courts between ice hockey games and baseball
games, based on theory that sport of baseball and possibility of being hit by ball
is more commonly known to general public than the game of ice hockey and its
incidents of danger).
"
2Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N. Y. 479, 166 N. E. 173, 174
(1929).
1' Goode v. Barton, 238 N. C. 492, 78 S. E. 2d 398 (1953).
1, Mountain v. Wheatley, Fox v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031
(1951) ; Doberrentz v. Gregory et al., 129 Conn. 57, 26 A. 2d 475 (1942) ; Bohn-
sack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N. W. 2d 79 (1952) ; White v. McVicker,
216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385 (1933) ; Brown v. Waller, 8 So. 2d 304 (La. App.,
2d Cir., 1942) ; Landru v. Stensrud et al., 219 Minn. 227, 17 N. W. 2d 322 (1945) ;
Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Landrum v. Roddy, 143
Neb. 934, 12 N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ; Woodman v. Peck, 90 N. H. 292, 7 A. 2d 251
(1939) ; Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946) ; Gill v. Ar-
thur, 69 Ohio App. 386, 43 N. E. 2d 894 (1941) ; Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App.
356, 123 S. W. 2d 828 (1938) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A. 2d 439
(1944) ; Johnsen v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367, 55 N. W. 2d 394 (1952).
"' Mountain v. Wheatley, Foss v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031
(1951) ; Doberrentz v. Gregory et al., 129 Conn. 57, 26 A. 2d 475 (1942) ; Pierce
v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836 (1943) (this court distinguishes
between "assumption Of risk" and "incurred risk," limiting "assumption of risk"
to contractual relations and applying doctrine of "incurred risk" where the rela-
tion is non-contractual) ; Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N. W. 2d 79
(1952) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429; 35 A. 2d 439 (1944).
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tion of the hazard by the guest, (3) acquiescence or a willingness to
proceed in the face of danger. 16
The general recognition by the courts of the distinction between
assumption of risk and contributory negligence has come about fairly
recently. The Virginia court, in distinguishing between the two terms,
said: "The essence of contributory negligence is carelessness; of as-
sumption of risk, venturousness."''1 The Ohio court expressed the
distinction: "Assumption of risk embraces a mental state of willingness
whereas contributory negligence is a matter of conduct."' 8 Sometimes
courts do not make the distinction, holding that in cases other than
master and servant and contract, assumption of risk is but a phase
of contributory negligence.29 In actions involving assumption of risk,
it is sometimes said that the terms may be used interchangeably, as
assumption of risk is the practical equivalent of contributory negli-
gence.20
The North Carolina court has not recognized the distinction, con-
sistently holding that
If two ways are open to a person to use, one safe and the other
dangerous, the choice of the dangerous way, with knowledge of
the danger constitutes contributory negligence . . . and where
a person sui juris knows of a dangerous condition and volun-
tarily goes into a place of danger, he is guilty of contributory
negligence which will bar his recovery.2 1
In Norfleet v. Hall,22 where plaintiff was a guest in defendant's
automobile and was injured in a collision due to defendant's excessive
speed, the Supreme Court referred to and did not allow a defense of
assumption of risk. Mr. Justice Stacy, in his dissent, declared that
"6 Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836 (1943); Saxton v.
Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Johnsen v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367,
55 N. W. 2d 394 (1952); 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 2511
(1946) ; 1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLirENcE § 135 (1941) ; Note, 37 MAR-
QuErTF L. REv. 35 (1953).g7Tiller v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 190 Va. 605, 612, 58 S. E. 2d 45, 48 (1950);
Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 217, 193 S. E. 57, 58 (1937).
"
8 Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236, 241 (1946).
" Warlich v. Miller et al., 73 F. Supp. 593 (W. D. Pa. 1947) (cf. Rauch v.
Penn. Sports & Enterprises, 237 Pa. 632, 81 A. 2d 548 [1951]); McGeever v.
O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508 (1919) ; Peyla v. Duluth M. & I. R. R. Co.,
218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W. 2d 518 (1944); Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N. C. 649, 18
S. E. 2d 162 (1941); Singletary v. A. C. L. R. Co., 217 S. C. 212, 60 S. E. 2d
305 (1950).
"'Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N. C. 649, 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1941) ; Wilson v. Moudy,
22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S. W. 2d 828 (1938).
" Dunnevant v. Southern Railway Co., 167 N. C. 232, 233, 234, 83 S. E. 347,
348 (1914) ; Groome v. Statesville, 207 N. C. 538, 540, 177 S. E. 638, 639 (1934) ;
Gordon v. Sprott, 231 N. C. 472, 476, 57 S. E. 2d 785, 788 (1950) ; Bogen v. Bogen,
220 N. C. 649. 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1941).
22204 N. C. 573, 169 S. E. 143 (1953).
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the case "runs counter to the doctrine of volenti non fit infuria," and
Mr. Justice Brogden, also dissenting, made the comment, "It is rather
difficult to be reconciled to the idea that a person can recover damages
for being bitten by his own dog."
In Bogen v. Bogen,23 another guest case, wherein plaintiff testified
that she and her husband started on an auto trip from Columbus, Ohio,
through North Carolina to Washington, D. C., to Philadelphia and back
to Columbus, and that she had theretofore had to remonstrate with her
husband about his careless and reckless driving 365 days in: the-year,
the court said:
The . . . conclusion that she thereby committed a primary act
of negligence conclusively evidencing a want of due care for her
own safety contribuiing to her own injury seems to us to be in-
escapable .... That this is the Aiecessary result of such conduct
is sustained by the authorities in other jurisdictions. Some treat
it under the doctrine of assumption of risk and some as contribu-
tory negligence. By whatever name it may be called, the con-
sensus of opinion expressed in these authorities is to the effect
that one who voluntarily places himself in a position of peril
known to him fails to exercise ordinary care for his own safety
and thereby commits an act of continuing negligence which will
bar any right of recovery for injuries resulting from such peril.24
In Bruce v. Flying Service,25 an action for wrongful death of plain-
tiff's intestate in a plane crash, the defendant contended in the Supreme
Court that plaintiff's intestate had assumed the risk. The court re-
versed the granting of a nonsuit on the ground that there was some
evidence of negligence which should have been submitted to the jury. In
the course of its opinion, the court said:
Under the evidence the plea of assumption of risk is not tenable.
... The pleas of assumption of risk and contributory negligence
are both affirmative and require a showing on the part of the
defendant to be considered at all; and to prevail as a matter of
law, as to either, it must plainly appear from the evidence that
a reasonable mind could draw no other inference.2 6
In Erickson v. Baseball Club, Inc.,2 plaintiff sued for damages for
injuries sustained when hit by a foul ball while he was attending a
"3220 N. C. 649, 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1941).
'Id. at 651, 18 S. E. 2d at 164.
.'231 N. C. 181, 56 S. E. 2d 560 (1951).
.Id. at 187, 188, 56 S. E. 2d at 564.
'1233 N. C. 627, 65 S. E. 2d 140 (1951).
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baseball game. The court held a nonsuit proper, evidently on grounds
of assumption of risk, and said:
Anyone familiar with the game of baseball knows that balls are
frequently fouled into the stands and bleachers. Such are common
incidents of the game which necessarily involve danger to spec-
tators. And where a spectator, with ordinary knowledge of the
game of baseball, on finding all screened seats filled, proceeds
to sit in an unscreened stand, as did the plaintiff under the cir-
cumstances of this case, he thereby accepts the common hazards
incident to the game and assumes the risk of injury, and ordi-
narily there can be no recovery for an injury sustained as a re-
sult of being hit by a batted ball .... Thus, it would seem that
the plaintiff, with full knowledge of all the dangers of the occa-
sion, voluntarily assumed the risk of his situation, or failed to
exercise due care to protect himself from the natural dangers
incident to his situation. And no other reasonable inference
being deducible from the evidence, the motion for nonsuit was
properly allowed.2 8  (Italics added.)
In an earlier case involving a similar set of facts, the court held a
nonsuit proper on the basis that the failure to place a roof over bleacher
seats or to erect a wire in front thereof was not negligence on the part
of those responsible for the operation of the ball park.29
The statement by the court in the principal case is supported by
its earlier decisions. In Morrison v. Cannon Mills Co.,3 0 plaintiff, a
truck driver for a transportation company, was injured while unloading
caustic soda which he had delivered to defendant's plant. Defendant
contended that plaintiff was aware of the dangers involved and that
there was no water available nearby, but that he undertook to make
the disconnecting operation by himself with knowledge, obtained from
past experience, of the manner in which it could be safely done. The
court stated that it should be noted at the outset that there was no
relation of master and servant or of employer-employee existing be-
tween the defendant and the plaintiff and that there was no contractual
relation existing between the plaintiff or his employer and the de-
fendant.
In a still earlier decision,3 ' in a case where plaintiff's intestate was
killed in an explosion at a filling station owned by defendant oil com-
pany and leased to defendant employer of the deceased, the court held
8 d. at 629, 630, 65 S. E. 2d at 141, 142.
Cates v. Exhibition Co. & City of Durham, 215 N. C. 64, 1 S. E. 2d 131
(1938).( 223 N. C. 387, 26 S. E. 2d 857 (1943).
"Broughton v. Oil Co., 201 N. C. 282, 159 S. E. 321 (1931).
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that as between plaintiff and defendant oil company, assumption of
risk by plaintiff's intestate was not available as a defense because there
was no contractual relation between the parties.
Thus it is seen that the court's statement in the principal case is
in accord with previous North Carolina decisions. But in confining
the doctrine of assumption of risk as a separate defense to contract
cases and master and servant relationships, while in all other areas
considering it as a phase of contributory negligence, North Carolina
does not follow the general trend of American decisions.
. NAOmi E. MoRRs
Workmen's Compensation Act-Accidents Arising Out of and In
the Course of the Employment-Street Risks-Dual Employment
Deceased was employed by the city as cemetery caretaker-salesman.
In addition he was allowed to take private employment as a sexton. In
this dual capacity he regularly visited local funeral homes to solicit
business. On one such trip, while crossing the street, he was struck
by an automobile and killed. In awarding compensation the Commis-
sion concluded that death resulted from an accidental injury which arose
out of and in the course of the employment. The Supreme Court, in
a unanimous decision, affirmed, stating that the Commission was cor-
rect in its determination that while decedent was paid by others
for digging graves, this was related to his general duties as "caretaker,"
and the employee status, as distinguished from that of an independent
contractor, was properly established.'
The heart of North Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act is
expressed in the formula "arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployment."2 In interpreting this section our court holds that (1) "in the
course of employment" relates to the time, place, and circumstances
under which the accidental injury occurs, and (2) "arising out of the
employment" refers to the origin or the cause of the injury.3 This
formula has kept the Act within the limits of its intended scope of
providing compensation benefits for industrial injuries rather than
"branching out into the field of general health insurance." 4 The Act is
to be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative intent and no
strained nor technical construction should be given to defeat this pur-
pose.6 Whether or not an accident arose out of the employment is
'Hinkle v. Lexington, 239 N. C. 105, 79 S. E. 2d 220 (1954).
'N. C. Gml. STAT. § 97-2 (f) (1950).
' Sweatt v. Board of Education, 237 N. C. 653, 75 S. E. 2d 738 (1953);
Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S. E. 2d 668 (1949) ; Walker v. Wilkins,
Inc., 212 N. C. 627, 194 S. E. 89 (1937); Davis v. North State Veneer Corp.,
200 N. C. 263, 156 S. E. 859 (1931).
'Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 91, 66 S. E. 2d 22, 25 (1951).
'Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38, 155 S. E. 728 (1930). But as pointed
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a mixed question of law and fact and when supported by competent
evidence, the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission, on a claim
properly constituted under the Act, are conclusive on appeal.7
The court early recognized the necessity of interpreting and apply-
ing the above formula largely on the facts of each particular case and'
that general definitions excluding or embracing certain acts as causative
factors within its terms would be unsatisfactory.8 Three years after the
adoption of the Act one writer concluded that "with few exceptions, the
North Carolina cases have reflected a disposition toward a liberal con-
struction of the sectibn 'arising out of and in the course of employment,'
but not a disposition toward the 'radically liberal' attitude adopted by
some jurisdictions."9  It is the purpose of this note to determine if
this liberal trend of interpretation has continued.
In the principal case the court established the causal relation of
the accident to the employment to bring it within the statutory formula
"arising out of and in the course of the employment," found the em-
ployee status properly established, and affirmed the findings of the
Commission that "when as an incident of the employment and in the
performance of a duty connected with it, as shown by the established
custom, the decedent crossed the street enroute to a funeral home, the
hazard of the journey may properly be regarded as within the scope
of the Act."'1
A difference of opinion arises in the application of the formula "aris-
ing out of and in the course of the employment" to embrace a fatal
accident in the street as a hazard of the employment."' Many states
out by Justice Barnhill in Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N. C. 11, 29 S. E. 2d 137
(1944): "This rule is . . . one, benefiting the injured party only in those cases
where the act applies. It cannot be invoked to determine when the Act does
apply. The doctrine of liberal construction arises out of the Act itself, and re-
lates to cases falling within the purview of the Act. Until it is adjudicated af-
firmatively that the employer-employee relationship existed at the time of the
accident no interpretation of the Act-liberal or otherwise-comes within the
scope of judicial inquiry." Ibid, p. 19.
Matthews v. Carolina Standard Corp., 232 N. C. 229, 60 S. E. 2d 93 (1950).
Fox v. Mills, Inc., 225 N. C. 580, 35 S. E. 2d 869 (1945).
' Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N. C. 733, 155 S. E. 728 (1930).
0 Note, 10 N. C. L. REv. 373 (1932).
10 "The usual test for determining whether the relationship between the parties
is that of employer and employee or independent contractor is whether the em-
ployer has the right to control the workmen with respect to the manner and
method of doing the work as distinguished from the mere right to require certain
results, and it is not material or determinative of the relationship whether the
employer actually exercises the right to control." Hinkle v. Lexington, 239 N. C.
105, 79 S. E. 2d 220 (1954). This test was earlier set out in Hayes v. Elon
College, 224 N. C. 11, 29 S. E. 2d 137 (1934). The result in the Hinkle case
is not surprising even though it is quite plausible that when he was killed he
was en route in his capacity as an independent contractor. Neither the Com-
mission nor the Court seem to have considered as decisive that this trip may have
been made solely in pursuance of his duties as "lot salesman."
"lJ. E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 652 (1922);
Capital Paper Co. v. Conner, 81 Ind. App. 545, 144 N E. 474 (1924) ; Hinkle v.
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refuse compensation for injuries incurred from "street risks" on the
theory that an injury to an employee while using the street does not
arise out of the employment for the risk of such injuries are common
to everyone wsing the streets and are not peculiar to the employment
(Italics supplied) .12 North Carolina appeared to be in this category
when, in 1938,13 the court reversed the lower court and re-instated the
findings of the Commission that where the street risk was common to
all the neighborhood and was not incidental to the employment it did
not arise out of the employment.1 4 Evidence was that employee, who
worked irregularly, had gone to the employer's plant to do a job. As he
was leaving he was called to the aid of the night watchman. In cross-
ing the street to aid the watchman he slipped on a fruit peel and was
injured. There is prior authority, however, for the rule that an em-
ployee may recover where he suffered a street injury when as part of
Lexington, 239 N. C. 105, 79 S. E. 2d 220 (1954) (apply the formula) : Hopkins
v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87, 150 N. W. 325 (1915) (refuse to apply
the formula). For a more complete discussion of street risks see HoOwi'z,
WORKcmN'S COMPENSATION (1944) 95-99.
" Note, 23 N. C. L. RExv. 159 (1945).
" Lochey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N. C. 356, 196 S. E. 342 (1938).
" Somewhat analagous to the street risk cases are those which involve so called
"Acts of God." It is universally held that injury due to lightning, windstorms,
earthquake, freezing, sunstroke, and exposure to contagious disease arise out
of the employment if the employment increases the risk of this particular harm.
Some courts accept a showing that the risk was an actual risk of the particular
enployment regardless of whether it is greater or less than that of the general
public. 1 LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 51 (1952). An
exception to the rule that the employment must increase the risk is the holding
that if the harm, though initiated by an act of God, takes effect through contact
of the employee with any part of the premises, the causal connection with the
employment is shown. Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N. E. -2d 328 (1940).
The reasoning that the particular risk encountered was not peculiar to the em-
ployment has led to illogical results. Netherton v. Lightning Delivery Co., 32
Ariz. 350, 258 Pac. 306 (1927) (the presence of a driver on a high hill rejected
as a showing of any special risk when he was struck by lightning while making
a delivery). Generally, however, courts take judicial notice that lightning is
attracted to high places and structures. Trucks Ins. Exchange v. Ind. Acc.
Comm., 77 Cal. App. 2d 461, 175 P. 2d 884 (1947). Another case refused com-
pensation where a workman froze his hands while shoveling snow. The court
stated that he was not, by reason of his occupation, exposed to a special or
peculiar danger from freezing greater than that shared by other persons in the
same locality. Consumers Co. v. Industrial Commission, 324 Ill. 152, 154 N. E.
423 (1926). The obvious answer is that the general public is not out shoveling
snow in twenty degree below weather. "The very work which the deceased was
doing . . . exposed him to a greater hazard from heat stroke than the general
public was exposed to for the simple reason that the general public were (sic)
not pushing wheelbarrow loads of sand in the hot sun on that day." American
Gen. Insur. Co. v. Webster, 118 S. W. 2d 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
The majority of courts have discarded the "peculiar or increased risk" doc-
trine, and have substituted either the "actual risk" doctrine where the test is,
was the injury a risk of the employment, or the "position risk" doctrine adopted
by a few courts, that an injury arises out of the employment if it would not
have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employ-
ment placed him in the position where he was injured. 1 LARSON, THE LAw OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 43 (1952).
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his employment, he was sent for material with which to work.15 In
at least two cases10 the Commission has arrived at a conclusion contra
to that of the Lochey case and allowed recovery where the employee
received a street injury, when his employment required his presence
in the street.'7
Ostensibly, then, North Carolina is in accord with the majority
rule that if the employment occasions the employee's use of the street,
the risks of the street are the risks of the employment and it is im-
material whether the nature of the employment involves continuous or
only occasional exposure to its dangers.' 8 Whether North Carolina
will go so far as to adopt the "position risk" doctrine, that an injury
arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for
the fact that the condition and obligation of the employment placed
the claimant in the position where he was injured, is doubtful. This
doctrine seems but a refinement of the "but for" rule which is incon-
sistent with the requirement of a causal relation between the employ-
ment and the injury, and which is almost universally rejected.'0
Recent cases ° indicate that North Carolina, in accord with the
majority,2' will resist the expansion of the Compensation Act into the
general field of health insurance by re-emphasizing the necessity for
a clear showing of a causal relation between the work and the injury.
Thus, in Sweatt v. Board of Education,22 the court reversed the Com-
mission's grant of compensation where the deceased had served both
as principal of a public school and as superintendent of an adjacent
orphanage, and was killed by a resident of the orphanage who was also
" Massey v. Board of Education, 204 N. C. 193, 167 S. E. 2d 695 (1933).
Evidence showing that deceased, a janitor, when sent to purchase cleaning
materials was struck and killed while crossing the street, held sufficient to show
that the injury was from an accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment.
' Clinton v. Shuford National Bank, 9304 (Workmen's Compensation Case)
(Sept. 1940). Employee enroute to pick up mail slipped on oil on the street.
Recovery allowed. Accord, Walker v. Piedmont Publishing Co. (Nov. 1940).
"'The expansion of the "street risk" doctrine is perhaps well justified when
we consider the dangers of a city street as depicted by the New York Court of
Appeals. See, Matter of Katz v. Kadans & Co., 232 N. Y. 420, 134 N. E. 330
(1922).
181 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 77 (1952).
"Ibid, p. 43.
"' Sweatt v. Board of Education, 237 N. C. 653, 75 S. E. 2d 738 (1953) ; and
Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 66 S. E. 2d 22 (1951). In the latter case,
deceased, a member of the city fire department, died of a coronary occlusion
while on his annual vacation. The Commission awarded compensation on the
basis of a 1949 amendment which included certain diseases within coverage of
the Act as to active members of a fire department. Reversed by the court as
repugnant to Article 1, sect. 7 of the North Carolina Constitution which forbids
conferring exclusive or special emoluments on certain men or groups of men.
21 Larson points out that 41 states require a clear showing that the injury is
within the formula "arising out of and in the course of the employment" to be
compensable. THE LAw OF WoRx cN's COMPENSATION 41 (1952).22237 N. C. 653, 75 S. E. 2d 738 (1953).
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a student of the public school, after deceased had reprimanded him
for violation of orphanage rules. The court denied compensation,
even though the reprimand was administered by the principal
while conducting study hall in the school, and he was killed
while sitting at his desk making out school reports. In re-
versing, the court determined that deceased had not reprimanded
the boy in his capacity as principal but in his capacity as superintendent
of the orphanage.2 It is patent from the record that the death of de-
ceased occurred in the course of his employment, but the essential
element of causation is lacking. It appears, then, that where claimant
was serving in a dual capacity North Carolina requires a clearer show-
ing of a causal relationship between the injury and the particular em-
ployment from which he seeks compensation.2 4 Had the "position risk"
doctrine been adopted in Sweatt v. Board of Education25 compensation
would have been allowed, for the obligation of the employment placed
the deceased in his general supervisory position in the school that night
and it was in that position and in that place that he was killed.
In effectuating the intent of the legislature a court is justified in
refusing to adopt such doctrines as that of "position risk" and in re-
quiring a clear showing of a causal relation. In carrying out this in-
tent a well balanced concept of the nature of Workmen's Compensation
is indispensible to a proper understanding of current cases and to a
proper interpretation of the Act. One author 26 has observed that almost
every major error that can be noted in the development of the compen-
sation law, whether judicial or legislative, can be traced either to im-
-3 The findings of the Commission were that "as principal, deceased repri-
manded the student for a violation of the rules . . . The student, as a result
of the reprimand, became angry, obtained a gun and killed Sweatt. The rule
violated was formulated by the orphanage. This, however, is of no importance.
The reprimand was administered by the deceased as principal of Union Mills
High School to a student in that school. It cannot be said that in administering
the reprimand the deceased went beyond his employment as principal. The de-
ceased came to his death as a result of an injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment by the defendants as principal of the Union Mills
High School." Ibid at 655. However, the Supreme Court determined that the
record was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the finding of the Commis-
sion.
" Deceased served as deputy, employed by the sheriff, and as jailer, employed
by the county. Compensation was denied when it was shown that he was killed
while trying to make an arrest two doors from the rear of the jail. Gowens v.
Alamance County, 216 N. C. 107, 3 S. E. 2d 339 (1939). (The Act did not then
treat deputies as employees of the county). Earlier, in Gowens v. Alamance
County, 214 N. C. 18, 197 S. E. 538 (1938), the Supreme Court had remanded
the case to the Commission for a finding specifically whether the injury was in
the course of his employment as jailor. The Commission had determined that
the injury was within the scope of his employment. The court overruled this
finding and concluded that the attempted arrest was clearly outside the scope
of his employment as jailer.
2t5237 N. C. 635, 75 S. E. 2d 738 (1953).
'1 LARSoif, THE LAW or WO aMEN'S COMPENSATION (1952).
1954]
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portation of tort ideas and the concept of proximate cause,27 or the
attempt to compare with general health insurance and the failure to
appreciate the social policy expressed by the enactment of the Act.
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability
is belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most dignified and
most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the victims
of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community
would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory
form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most
appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the product.28
One may conclude today that the North Carolina court's interpreta-
tion of the formula "arising out of and in the course of the employment"
and its attitude in applying the Act is a continuation of that earlier
found to exist: "a disposition toward a liberal construction but not
toward the radically liberal attitude adopted by some jurisdictions." 20
The result of the Hinkle decision is again indicative that the court is
effectively carrying out the policy of the legislature in its interpretation
of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
JAmEs ALBERT HOUSE, JR.
7 In the Lochey case, supra, the court said the injury must be traced to the
employment as a contributing proximate cause. This test is said to be obsolete.
"But the requirement of proximate or legal cause is out of place in compensation
law ...Arising out of the employment does not mean exactly the same thing as
legally caused by the employment. It is true, as many courts have said, that
'arising' has something to do with causal connection; but ...when you speak
of an event arising out of the employment the .. . moving force is something
other than the employment; the employment is thought of more as a condition
out of which the event arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative
fashion . . In tort law the beginning point is always a person's act, and the act
causes certain consequences. In Workmen's Compensation law, the beginning is
not an act at all; it is a relation, or condition, or situation-namely, employment
... Finally, 'proximate cause' or 'legal cause' is out of place in compensation law
because ... it is a concept which is in itself thoroughly suffused with the idea
of fault . . . The primary test of 'legal' or 'proximate cause' . .. is foreseeability,
which is the 'fundamental basis of the law of negligence' . . . There is nothing
in the theory of compensation liability which cares whether the employer foresaw
particular kinds of harm or not. . . " 1 LAaSON, THE LAw OF WORKxI!NS CoM-
PENSATION pp. 45-47 (1952).28 Ibid, at p. 5.2
'Nemeth v. University of Denver, - Colo. -, 257 P. 2d 423 (1953).
This is an example of what might be called the "radically liberal attitude adopted
by some jurisdictions." Claimant, a student regularly enrolled in the Univer-
sity, was granted compensation for an injury suffered in football. The court
found that he was an employee of the University as a result of his employment
in jobs on the campus which were dependent on his playing football. "In the
instant case the employment . . . so far as Nemeth was concerned, was dependent
on his playing football. Under the record the Commission and the District Court
may have properly concluded as they did determine that Nemeth was an em-
ployee of the University and sustained an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of his employment." Ibid, p. 427. This does not seem an unreason-
able conclusion.
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